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Guardian of the Atlantic

Marine Corps Gazette

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

COVER

Fifteen flags fly in front of a headquarters at Norfolk, Va. Fourteen of them are the flags of the member NATO nations — the fifteenth, which flys 24 hours a day, belongs to SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic). A sea command of NATO, with responsibility covering an area stretching from the North Pole to the Tropic of Capricorn, the Allied Command Atlantic becomes two years old on the 10th of this month. For a better understanding of the composition and the functions of the world's first international ocean command turn to page 28. Our cover shot was taken at SACLANT headquarters by Colonel L. M. Mason, author of the article.

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

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message center

Anthology

DEAR SIR:

A few days ago I was looking through a stack of dusty books and stumbled upon an all-but-forgotten copy of the *Infantry Journal Reader*, an anthology of various articles that have appeared in the *Infantry Journal* throughout the years. Looking it over, the thought occurred to me, "Why couldn't the GAZETTE do the same thing for Marines and our amphibious thought?"

Perhaps the readers might voice an opinion on the matter.

PATRICK C. ROE
Capt, USMC

Quantico, Va.

Who Was First?

DEAR SIR:

On this question as to whether Samuel Nicholas can be properly entitled our first Commandant—

The question was put to the Historical Section for a decision in 1947 or 1948, if I remember. After some research and reflection, it was our recommendation that Major Nicholas be considered Commandant No. 1, and this ruling has since been followed in the numbering of the Commandants up to the present (e.g., General Shepherd is referred to as the 20th, not the 19th Commandant, and so on back). So the GAZETTE was quite in step in its November piece on Nicholas.

Moreover, if Major Nicholas is *not* the first Commandant (because his Continental Marines were not, it is argued, today's Marine Corps), then we should forthwith forget about November 10th 1775—and get ourselves a new Marine Corps Birthday: July 11th 1798.

Is MSgt Hopkins, and others who have questioned Major Nicholas' status, willing to do this? All in favor of July 11th instead of November 10th, say "Aye."

R. D. HEINL, JR.
LtCol, USMC

N. Devon, England

Every Marine a Typist

DEAR SIR:

Could not the training program of the Marine Corps be profitably revised to include a brief introduction to the typewriter and the fundamentals of official correspondence?

How many officers in the Corps have suddenly found themselves with official documents to prepare, only to discover they are blessed with a duty clerk who considers the typewriter in a class with electronics equipment?

Subsequently, these officers are compelled to draw upon their own limited experience when their presence is required elsewhere. . . .

The minute amount of time devoured by such training would be repaid ten-fold. Not implying that such training should replace our bayonet instruction, but rather to supplement the versatility of our already versatile Marines.

E. C. MEEK
2dLt, USMC

Quantico, Va.

Play Ball

DEAR SIR:

Shape-Up For 'A' War was an even more disappointing result of the recent essay contest than *Of Mortars And Men*. The former showed obvious signs of extensive editing. Presumably this was done for security reasons. The original manuscript may have been a prize-winning essay but the printed version was almost meaningless.

The invitation of the Editorial Board to "rebutt" the article is comical. Nothing but conclusions are printed. You don't rebutt conclusions, you deny them.

We have had two foul balls. Here's hoping the final winner is at least a bunt.

W. F. PRICKETT
Col, USMC

Arlington, Va.

ED: *Major editorial surgery was not practiced on* Shape-Up For 'A' War.

DEAR SIR:

Far be it from me to attempt to do any "lint picking" on Captain Canzona's important and well thought-out article, "Shape-Up For 'A' War." Among other things, he shows he has in mind the problems of the "span of control"—the principle that one executive or commander can efficiently supervise directly, no more than 10 or 12 immediate subordinates.

Undoubtedly many others beside myself will wonder just how Captain Canzona thinks the problem can be met, beyond the approaches to it he makes in his article, such as placing more of the supporting arms with reinforced battalions.

He says to think of the nine battalions as not on line but in columns, but the fact remains that nine battalion commanders would be immediately under the division commander along with other directly subordinate commanders. There are about 10 of them in the present Marine division. Could their number be reduced enough so that, with the nine battalion commanders, they

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

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

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would not be beyond the "span of control?"

If that control principle holds true under ordinary circumstances faced by civilian and military organizations, wouldn't it be even more true in the hurry and fury of an atomic landing?

A. H. JENKINS
LtCol, USMCR (Ret)
Washington, D. C.

Sergeant Major's Billett

DEAR SIR:

With the news that the enlisted classification structure was to be revised, the rumor presisted that sergeants major were to be definitely identified, as they were under the previous system. Upon promulgation of MCMemo 48-53, this proved to be rumor only.

Has anyone at the planning level given any thought to such provision? Some years ago, under the old SSN, 584 (SgtMaj) was specific enough to identify an individual for prospective assignment to a billet. MOS 0149 is vague at best, in view of the fact that many 0149's are not qualified or experienced as sergeants major. When the new structure becomes effective, the situation will be further confused, with 0141 (administrative clerk) expected to identify the various job titles now carrying separate MOS's.

With all due regard for the obvious difficulty of setting up a workable structure, isn't this tending to defeat the purpose of personnel classification in general?

F. J. FEELEY
MSgt, USMC
Korea

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Marine Corps Academy

DEAR SIR:

The Marine Corps needs an academy as a Marine needs his MI. Every branch of service in the country has an academy: Coast Guard, Navy, Army, Merchant Marine and now the Air Force. All but the finest fighting outfit in the world has an academy—The United States Marines.

A United States Marine Corps Academy would start a great new epic to Marine tradition and history. The Academy would stand as a memorial to all the Marines who have heard the call for taps. . . . .

WILLIAM T. GLADMON
Sgt, USMCR
Hyattsville, Md.

Mortars

DEAR SIR:

The many statements implying artillery infallability and infantry ineptitude in *Of Mortars And Men* by LtCol J. J. Wade, Jr., speak for bias, not objectivity. Concern for "maudlin" mortarmen being blown off the beach by electronic counter-weapons might better have been saved for artillerymen subjected to artillery counter-battery fire. Personnel failures, rather than the weapon itself, have caused a high percentage of past mortar short rounds and premature explosions.

If Colonel Wade's essay produces incentive to improve mortar training, ballistics and employment it will have accomplished a purpose far more worthy than intended.

R. M. HOGUE
LtCol, USMC
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

DEAR SIR:

Supporting fires have always been

"Gunner to Pilot . . . two fighters . . . turning in!"

No TIME to repeat this message. He must get every word right the first time.

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at a premium during the crucial stages of battle. There is nothing economical in reducing the number of weapons at the expense of riflemen. If the mortar is such a "treacherous" weapon, then let's get busy and build the infantryman a better weapon for the mission and effect our savings elsewhere.

The greatest economy I can think of would result from limiting the division to one typewriter and eliminating the mimeograph machine.

Give the infantryman the tools to do his job, and let him do it. If he can't do it without a two-volume op-order to guide his every move, get one who can. Make the economies in the rear areas and quit harassing the man up front.

In parting, I fear that if we deleted the mortars that the 1,707 personnel saved for other uses would end up in support units thinking up more reports for the infantryman to make.

J. A. POUNDS, III
LtCol, USMC

Oahu, T.H.

DEAR SIR:

. . . If the mortar is "potent, but uneconomical," let's not begin saving the magnificent dollar to the enemy's delight at the application end of military training. Instead, continue to whittle away at the top-heavy special staffs and service units. In doing this, we'll be able to increase the size of our mortar units beyond what has recently been approved after a careful and objective approach.

R. E. WASE
Maj, USMC

Quantico, Va.

DEAR SIR:

. . . . Until such time as we are forced to consider some other criteria we have yet to discover, I cannot sincerely believe the 60s, the 81s, the 4.2s, and the 569 men who are required to run them, and their logistical support are not sufficiently justified.

MORRIS D. COOKE
Capt, USMC

Parris Island, S. C.

For the Want of a Nail

DEAR SIR:

The locker box issued to personnel in the Marine Corps in many instances is sent to reclamation and

Dropping film magazines from reconnaissance plane to rearline station for processing.

ON THE JOB . . . not "on the way"

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salvage because the small wooden portion where the eye of the hasp is, becomes loose. This condition occurs quite frequently because this particular part is held by only four nails. Over a period of time, normal usage causes the part to give way.

If the wooden portion was held in place by four wood screws it would last much longer.

WILLIE T. LOWE, JR.
TSgt, USMC
Jacksonville, Fla.

ED: *We forwarded TSgt Lowe's letter to the Equipment Board. They considered it a good suggestion, and forwarded it to the Depot of Supplies at Philadelphia, Pa. to be acted upon.*

DEAR SIR:

Send a quick requisition for a journalistic artilleryman. For the second month in a row your boys have pulled a blooper on artillery weapons:

January issue: (page 33)—a 75mm pack-howitzer captioned ". . . flat trajectory only." The guy was thinking of a French 75 of course.

February issue: (page 39)—an old 155mm Schneider howitzer captioned, "1918—8-inch howitzers."

As a newspaperman, I know what a headache it is to get weapons correctly identified in cutlines. But as an old artilleryman (Army-type, 8-inch How.), I am constrained to call your attention to the errors.

Let me quickly add that I think the GAZETTE is a magnificent publication. But do get that artilleryman.

EDWARD A. O'NEILL
The Louisville Times
Louisville, Ky.

ED: *We've got him! Sergeant J. T. O'Sullivan just reported aboard from 30 months of duty with the 10th Marines.*

Mother's View

DEAR SIR:

My son, William, has the GAZETTE sent to me. I enjoy it very much. It gives me more of an inside idea about the Marine Corps.

MRS. A. OOMS
Holland, Mich.

ANY MILITARY LOAD ANYWHERE by FLYING BOXCAR







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

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A WHOLE ORCHESTRA AT HIS FINGER TIPS. Harold Warner, Jr., seated at the concert organ in the Richmond, Va., civic center. This famous organ was about to be dismantled until it was restored by Mr. Warner, a telephone company craftsman.

The Once Proud Pipe Organ That Played Again

For ten long years, the great organ had stood mute. Time and dust had robbed it of its song.

Now it looked as if it would never play again. For the cost of restoring it was $30,000, and that was more than the city's auditorium could afford.

But before it could be dismantled, Harold Warner, Jr., offered his services. He was a central office repairman for the Bell Telephone Company in Richmond, Va., and a fine amateur musician. He loved organ music and he had repaired and maintained several other fine instruments. The city gladly gave him permission to work on the big organ.

It took most of his spare time for two years. Thirteen hundred and eighty-four pipes had to be cleaned. Hundreds of small parts had to be checked and polished; thousands of electrical connections tightened.

It was a big job but he got it done. The cost to the city? Just $32.50 for small parts.

You can imagine the thrill when he seated himself at the organ and its voice was heard again. In recognition of his work, the Mayor of Richmond, Dr. Edward E. Haddock, presented him with the Sertoma Club's *Service to Mankind Award*.

* * *

Harold Warner, Jr., is just one of many thousands of telephone people who give their own time and talents to helping the communities in which they live. In all things, on and off the job, they aim to be good citizens.

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our authors

Being continually asked what his assignment was at Norfolk induced **Colonel Leonard M. Mason** to prepare *SACLANT* (page 28) for the GAZETTE. Colonel Mason graduated from the University of Michigan in 1936 and was commissioned in the Marine Corps the same year. Shortly thereafter he was assigned to a ship's detachment and later was attached to the Marine Detachment at the New York World's Fair. During the war the colonel served with the 1st and 3d Divisions and at Headquarters Marine Corps. Among his decorations the colonel wears the Navy Cross and two Purple Hearts. Colonel Mason is presently assigned as Assistant Directors of Plans with SACLANT.



COL MASON

LtCol S. D. Mandeville points out the fact that Marine Corps correspondence isn't what it ought to be in *Let's Learn To Write* (page 25). Colonel Mandeville entered Basic School directly after graduating with a BS degree from the University of Georgia in 1939. His first assignment was as a sea-going detachment commander. Since then he has been an infantry battalion commander, a regimental S-3 and on the staff of CINCNELM in London. Later, he was assigned to the Strategic Planning Division and G-1, Headquarters Marine Corps. It was while there that Colonel Mandeville wrote *Strategic Planning*, an article that appeared in the GAZETTE in 1950. He graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces before reporting to Headquarters, 6th Marines, 2d Mar Div, Camp Lejeune, his current station.

LT COL MANDEVILLE

In *Props for the Prof* (page 49), **TSgt Lawrence L. Toolin**, a newcomer to the GAZETTE, tells just how effective training aids can be if they are used correctly. Sergeant Toolin, who is now instructing at the 2d Mar Div Leadership School at Camp Lejeune, N. C., rates two-and-a half hash marks. He has served in the training aids library and as a drill instructor at MCRD, San Diego; at FMFPac headquarters in 1948-50; and with the 5th Marines in Korea before going to Camp Lejeune.

TSGT TOOLIN

An accurate account of an arctic operation is presented in **Colonel Ronald R. Van Stockum's** *Operation Bluejay*. Born in England, the colonel came to this country and entered the University of Washington where he received his commission through the ROTC program. The colonel served aboard the battleship *Tennessee* and the carrier *Wasp*. He has also served with ComPhibGru-2, with the FMF in the Pacific Theater and as an inspector-instructor. A graduate of the Basic School and the Senior Course, Colonel Van Stockum is now Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, USNTC, Great Lakes, Illinois.

COL VAN STOCKUM

1stLt James F. Kingsley, now on inactive duty in New York, gives his views on how to get the most from a training exercise in *On Location With FEX*. Lt Kingsley, a graduate of the University of Notre Dame with an AB in journalism, was the publicity director of the American Red Cross at South Bend, Indiana and a free-lance writer before entering the Marine Corps. He received his commission upon completion of OCC at Parris Island in 1952 and later was assigned to NCO Leadership School at Camp Lejeune as an instructor. Lt Kingsley was also a platoon leader and later executive officer of a company in the 6th Marines.

1STLT KINGSLEY

At the risk of becoming repetitious we would again like to introduce **LtCol Harry W. Edwards**, author of *A Force in Readiness* (page 36). A constant source of informative and worth-while literature, Colonel Edwards is presently serving as Head of the Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters Marine Corps.

MAJ GOLLEHER

PROF. SEIDLER

Close for the Kill (page 12) was co-authored by **Major George M. Golleher** and University of Illinois' **Professor Armond H. Seidler**. Major Golleher, a graduate of Kansas State College, entered the Marine Corps in 1942 and was commissioned the following year. Since then he has served with the 14th Naval District Garrison Forces, the 1st Marine Division and FMFPac. The major, now attending the Junior School at Quantico, met Professor Seidler while serving as a Marine officer-instructor with the NROTC unit at the University of Illinois.

Professor Seidler is well versed in the art of personal defense having written several articles for physical education publications. A former instructor of hand-to-hand combat and bayonet fighting in the Army, the professor is presently co-authoring two books. His regular duties are Assistant Professor of Physical Education and Coordinator of Personal Defense at his Alma Mater, the University of Illinois. Professor Seidler is also a graduate of Beloit College and the American College of Physical Education, De Paul University, Chicago, Illinois.

Research for this new method of bayonet fighting was conducted on the Urbana campus of the University of Illinois as a research project sponsored by the School of Physical Education (Univ. of Ill.).

CLOSE FOR THE



By Dr. Armond H. Seidler

and

Major George Golleher

THE BAYONET WAS STANDARD equipment for the foot soldier in the various armies of the world long before the United States was a nation. While the bayonet itself has changed its shape in some slight measure, it is used today essentially the same way that it was used back in 1776: that is, as a pike to be thrust at an opponent with the intention of killing or wounding him by sticking the point into him. The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps are using as their official bayonet method, a system of bayonet fighting which has not changed to any significant degree since 1905. As a matter of fact, recent editions of the United States Army manual on the bayonet (FM 23-25) are very similar to manuals issued prior to 1905 and contain the same basic skills.

Most of the basic movements, including even the On Guard position in the present system of bayonet fighting are difficult to execute well, are awkward and uncomfortable, and the balances, speeds and co-ordinations of the movements are poor. The prescribed movements in bayonet drills bear little resemblance to any sports skills involving similar movements.

Many persons who have been and are yet involved with bayonet fighting instruction have expressed dissatisfaction with the official method. Many United States Marine Corps bases have taught a system which is different from the approved method, indicating a lack of confidence in the official system. Nevertheless, the official method of bayonet fighting is still that system expounded by FM 23-25.

About two years ago bayonet fighting came under study at the



University of Illinois. It was decided to attempt to devise a new system that would be better than the outmoded parade ground system now in use. After considerable study and testing, a new method was developed. It was not complicated. In fact, it was much simpler to learn, much simpler to teach and the movements were easier to execute and much more in conformance with natural movements.

The newly devised experimental method (hereinafter called Method "A") is a system of bayonet fighting closely approximating the techniques of the boxer, whereas the regulation method (hereinafter called Method "B") of bayonet fighting envisions the rifle and bayonet primarily as a pike to be thrust at an opponent. The theory underlying Method "A" is that the rifle and bayonet are used primarily as a quarterstaff, with the basic movements being butt strokes and slashes.

The position of Guard in the Method "A" system of bayonet fighting is very similar to the position of high port in the manual of arms. The only difference is that the sling of the rifle faces the opponent and the weapon is held a little further away from the body than is the case in a regulation high port.

There are only five basic attacks in the Method "A" system of bayonet fighting. They are: the Slash, the Horizontal Slash, the Vertical Butt Stroke, the Horizontal Butt Stroke and the Jab.

The Slash is executed almost exactly as the boxer executes a short, left jab. The bayonet fighter steps foward with his left or lead foot, extends his left or lead hand, pivots to the right and pulls his right hand back toward his chest. This results in an extremely fast slashing movement aimed at the neck area of the opponent. Actual timing shows this movement to be accompished in approximately 25/100 of a second. Recovery is made by rotating the body back to the left, advancing the right or rear foot and right hand and pulling the left hand back into the Guard position.

The Horizontal Slash is executed almost exactly like the left hook in boxing. In this offense the bayonet fighter steps forward with the left foot and at the same time bending the left arm and dropping the left hand so that the rifle and bayonet are almost horizontal. As the step forward continues. the bayonet fighter rotates his body sharply to the right and punches in a left hooking motion with his left or lead hand. The right hand is pulled across the body.

Recovery is made by bending the left arm and pulling the left hand back to the Guard position, rotating the body back to the left while taking a forward step with the right or rear foot, and pushing the right hand forward back into the guard position. This offense is aimed at the side of the opponent anywhere below the shoulders and accomplishment of the movement requires only 53/100 of a second to execute.

The Vertical Butt Stroke is executed almost exactly like the right upper-cut in boxing. As the movement begins, the bayonet fighter rotates his body slightly to the right and then rotates it strongly to the left. The left arm and hand pull back sharply. The right hand is pulled back slightly and then thrust forward and upward in a right upper-cut movement with the right arm well extended. The feet of the bayonet fighter remain in the starting position but both knees are slightly bent, and the right hip is carried forward so that the hips and shoulders of the bayonet fighter remain approximately parallel to one another as the body rotates to the left.

Recovery is made by rotating the body back to the right, straightening both knees back to the starting position, pulling the right hand back and down, and at the same time advancing the left hand and extending the left arm back to the starting position. This offense is aimed at the torso of the opponent in the center line anywhere from the groin up to the chin and takes only 48/100 of a second to execute.

The Horizontal Butt Stroke is executed almost exactly like the right hook in boxing. As the movement begins, the body of the bayonet fighter rotates strongly to the left. The left hand drops several inches, and the right hand is swung upward and pulled back slightly, then is swung around to the left in a strong, right hook movement at the end of which the right arm is almost completely extended. The rifle lies flat on its side in the striking position. Both feet remain in the starting position but the right knee is sharply bent and the hips are rotated around to the left, keeping nearly parallel to the shoulders.

Recovery is made by bending the right arm and dropping the right hand back to the starting position, at the same time raising the left hand several inches. While this is taking place the body of the bayonet fighter rotates to the right, back to the Guard position and the right knee is straightened back to the original position. This offense is aimed at the side of the opponent's head or neck or at the opponent's side anywhere below the shoulder, and it takes approximately 43/100 of a second to execute.

The Jab begins exactly like the Method "A" Slash. It may be likened to the long, left jab in boxing. The bayonet fighter advances his left foot forward and pivots to the right on his right foot. The left arm is lowered and the right arm raised so that the right forearm lies along the stock of the rifle which is now carried in a flat position. As the movement continues the left leg is carried further sideward (to the front), the trunk is bent to the front, and both arms are extended hard to the front.

Recovery is made by advancing the right or rear foot, rotating the body to the left, straightening the trunk, bending the left elbow considerably and slightly straightening the right elbow, bringing the body and the rifle back to the basic Guard position. This offense is a thrust and may be aimed at any part of the opponent's body which can be reached by a thrust. It is the long-range offense of this method of bayonet fighting and may be used as a follow-up of a Slash which may have been slightly short. This offensive movement has been timed in 66/100 of a second.

Method "A" consists of only the five basic movements described: the Slash, Horizontal Slash, Vertical Butt Stroke, Horizontal Butt Stroke and Jab. Any one of these movements may be executed from the Guard position. The Vertical Butt Stroke and the Slash are paired movements; that is, it is quite simple, easy and natural to execute these two movements in sequence regardless of which is used first. Similarly, the Horizontal Slash and the Horizontal Butt Stroke are paired movements: that is, it is quite easy and natural to follow either of these movements with the other, and it might prove quite feasible in combat to press an attack by alternating one and the other, of either of these sets of paired movements.

The Jab is the long-range move-

The slash: like a short, left jab

ment of this offense and is the only movement which is of a thrusting type. This movement combines well as a follow-up for a Slash which may have been short or as a follow-up for a Horizontal or Vertical Butt Stroke which proves to be short. Any of the other movements except the Slashes can be easily executed following a Jab.

The Guard position is an excellent defensive position. Since the weapon is carried in the vertical plane, any thrust at the bayonet fighter can be parried easily by allowing the tip of the attacking weapon to pass the line of the bayonet fighter's rifle and then smartly striking his weapon up or down into the attacking weapon and at right angles to it. It should be quite easy to deflect the attacking weapon out of line of the bayonet fighter's body. After this weapon is deflected the bayonet fighter should be able to counter quite effectively with any of his close-range offenses, namely, the Horizontal Slash or Slash or the Vertical or Horizontal Butt Strokes.

The Method "B" Vertical or Horizontal Butt Strokes, the Slash and Smash can all be parried rather easily from the Method "A" Guard position by merely moving the weapon toward the striking part of the opponent's weapon. As the blow is checked by contact with the held rifle, it is quick, easy to counter with a Slash or Vertical or Horizontal Butt Stroke.

The fact that the five offenses are almost exactly like the five basic offenses in boxing is extremely significant for several reasons. Boxing is one of the oldest sports known to man and the development of its basic movements (so similar to the Experimental Method movements), has been the result of many hundreds of years of experimentation and trial and error. These movements are natural, efficient, economical and the fact that most American men and boys have some background in the sport of boxing would indicate that acquisition of the skills of Method "A" would, in most cases, be easy and rapid.

In a discussion of the merits of the proposed system with Fifth Army Headquarters in Chicago, some of the officers contacted felt that the system of fighting being currently used should be revised, but expressed

Horizontal butt stroke

the opinion that the bayonet was an obsolete weapon and that they did not believe much bayonet fighting took place in Korea. During the course of the discussion an officer entered the room and joined the forum. This officer stated that he had served as an infantry battalion commander in Korea and that his troops had fought often with the bayonet. He admitted that though his troops had been trained in the bayonet techniques shown in the official field manual, when they engaged in close quarter fighting with the enemy they discarded the techniques which they had been taught and "used a system which was more natural." Furthermore, this officer produced combat reports of which the following is typical:

"The Company Commander ordered a bayonet charge upon the enemy entrenched on a hill. The enemy made no attempt to run, but engaged in close fighting and hand-to-hand combat. After the hill was secured, 47 enemy dead were counted on the forward slope, 30 of whom had met death from the bayonet. On the reverse slope another 50 enemy dead were counted who had died either of bayonet or gunshot wounds."

That officer heartily endorsed the proposed study and gave it great assistance. As a result of his help Fifth Army agreed to sponsor the investigation and aided materially in its successful completion.

Although a great number of persons who have been in contact with regulation bayonet techniques have expressed dissatisfaction with these techniques, the dissatisfaction in itself was not necessarily a valid criticism of the method currently used. If a person merely expounds a new method of bayonet fighting and goes no further, there is absolutely no reason to believe that the new method is superior. Consequently, it was essential that some careful, precise comparison of the two meth-

Energy compared by scientific analysis

Oxygen consumption carefully measured

ods be made which could demonstrate the relative merits of each. In order to make a careful, comparative evaluation, a study was set up which embodied the use of three different methods of investigation; one designed to analyze the mechanical aspects of each movement of bayonet fighting; one designed to measure the energy cost of each method of bayonet fighting; and one designed to measure the relative combative effectiveness of each method of bayonet fighting in comparison with the other. These investigations were conducted as follows:

Each of the movements of the two methods was photographed with the high speed movie camera and the film was then carefully measured and evaluated in an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. Which has the superior speed?
2. Which has the superior striking power?
3. Which has the superior balance?
4. Which presents the best defense?
5. Which is the most "natural?"

Then an experiment, using three highly trained subjects, was conducted in an attempt to measure which method of bayonet fighting would cost the greatest amount of energy.

Finally selected groups of military age personnel were carefully trained in each of the two methods of bayonet fighting. Members of each group were then paired off and matched in combative contests, each person using the skills taught him and using a substitute rifle and bayonet (a stick well padded at each end called a pugil stick) to answer the following questions:

1. Which method of bayonet fighting scores the most hits in competition?
2. Which method of bayonet fighting is the best in the opinion of the combatants?

The result of the investigations were amazing. The motion picture analysis produced measurements which indicated the following facts: All Method "A" offenses are faster than their corresponding Method "B" counterparts; all Method "A" skills have faster recovery times than their counterparts in Method "B;" the time 'out of guard' for all Method "A" skills is shorter than for their Method "B" counterparts; the Method "A" Guard position is a much sounder position than is its counterpart in Method "B," in terms of balance, defensive strength and possible offensive variety. All Method "B" skills require a greater range of body movement than their Method "A" counterparts and all Method "A" skills with one exception are greater in defensive potentialities at the peak of the movement than are their Method "B" counterparts. Method "A" skills are primarily weapon movements while Method "B" skills are primarily major body movements and the rate

Horizontal slash: a left hook







Vertical butt stroke: a rugged uppercut

of speed of the striking part of the weapon in the Method "A" skills is greater.

What does all this mean? It means primarily that the bayonet fighter is not being trained to accomplish the mechanical aspects of bayonet fighting in the most efficient manner. It does not necessarily mean that the experimental system is the only possible efficient method mechanically, but only that it is better mechanically than the regulation method now in use. The foot stance alone is sufficent to warrant a change in the system of body movements. The narrow long axis of foot positions of Method "B" for all movements makes balance precarious at best and balance becomes almost impossible if force is applied at right angles to the longitudinal axis.

An apparent feature of the Experimental Method is that each movement can be accomplished faster than its Method "B" counterpart. This may mean the difference between life and death for a bayonet fighter.

Another noticeable feature was the relative effectiveness between the "parry" of the regulation Method "B" and the "Block" of the experimental Method "A." The parry is at best a hit or miss proposition with the greater possibility for missing. Anyone who has learned the regulation bayonet fighting system recognizes this and realizes that it is indeed a considerate enemy who will place his bayonet and rifle in an extended position and hold it steady and still long enough for it to be effectively slapped aside or parried. It is about as effective and its possibility of happening is about as great as the throat jab that once was advocated by the regulation system wherein the enemy stood still with chin extended while his opponent properly placed his rifle butt next to his two feet, hunched down on the rifle in a prescribed manner and then lunged upward to impale the patiently waiting enemy under his extended chin. Fortunately, this particular movement has been done away with. However, its mechanical possibility was about on the same level as the presently used parry. Consider now the "Block" of Method "A." The rifle is in a position quite similar to high port except that the rifle is held with the sling facing toward the enemy and with the body approximately 14 inches behind the rifle, or even further depending upon the amount of crouch the fighter maintains in his movements. From this position the fighter is able to block any movement of the enemy rifle and knock it aside while at the same time remaining in position to deliver any of his offensive movements.

In his own movements, the bayonet fighter of Method "A" keeps a solid base from which his movements are performed. At no time is he extended to the point that his balance is precarious. Hips are always in line with the shoulders so that a more solid footing is obtained. In all movements, with exception of the Guard position, only the body profile and never the broad chest and stomach are presented for a possible enemy bayonet target.

In summarizing the motion picture analysis, the conclusions which must be drawn from the data clearly indi-

cate that Method "A" is, in general, superior to the regulation method from a mechanical standpoint. The fact that Method "A" skills are faster both in execution and recovery time as well as superior in striking force and body balance leads to this conclusion. The movements used in Method "B" are movements *not* seen in good sports performances, while on the other hand, each of the movements used in Method "A" is commonly used in the field of sports.

The energy cost experiment was conducted in the following manner: Each of the three subjects was trained until he was regarded as proficient in both the Regulation Method "B" and the Experimental Method "A." An experimental run consisted of the subject executing 80 skills of one bayonet method, in a period of two minutes at a rate of one skill per each one-and-one-half seconds. Forty-eight hours later, after complete rest the subject executed 80 skills of the other method under identical conditions. For both sets of skills, the subject wore a gas collection rig during and after the experiment and his total energy cost was computed by analysis of the quantity and quality of the collected gasses.

The measures derived from the oxygen requirements for Method "A" and Method "B," and converted into foot pounds showed Method "A" to be more economical than Method "B" by an average of 54,261 foot pounds per experimental run or an average of 27,130 foot pounds per minute.

Imagine what this means. An assault on the enemy position is conducted from 100 yards, up a steep grade and using assault fire. When the enemy position is reached it may be necessary for many reasons to use the bayonet. The assaulter is physically weary; the rifle and bayonet are heavy and the assaulter is puffing and panting from his exertions. Which system of bayonet fighting would be to his benefit?

The research involving group competition in bayonet fighting produced data which led to the following conclusions:

When two groups of students were given exactly the same amount of training, one in Method "A" and the other in Method "B," and were measured competitively under good testing conditions, Method "A" successfully demonstrated a clear-cut superiority over Method "B." In this phase of the testing each combatant was required to use the skills of the method which he had been taught. After the competition all the participants winning the individual combat by Method "A" and a majority of those who won their combat by Method "B" declared a firm conviction that Method "A" was superior to Method "B" and all of those winning by Method "B" declared that they won by either greater aggressiveness or because of a superiority of one individual over another.

Another competition held under poorer combative conditions (in which participants were not restricted to the use of skills representing the method each had learned) demonstrated clearly that the bayonet fighters who had been trained in the Regulation Method

Jab: a long left to the jaw





With gloves or a rifle, the same movements

"B" of bayonet fighting discarded the skills of that method of bayonet

fighting and adopted the skills of the Experimental Method (Method "A") even though they had never previously seen Method "A" and had never learned any of the skills of that method. In no case did those knowing only Method "A" adopt the skills of Method "B." This fact alone makes it obvious that instruction in the regulation method of bayonet fighting produces results much below the optimum since the bayonet fighters discarded the skills taught them during the bayonet training period. The fact that personnel trained in the techniques of Method "B," under the stress of combat, discarded the learned skills and instinctively adopted the skills of the experimental method, even though they had never previously seen these skills, indicates rather clearly that the skills of Method "A" are most "natural."

In order to develop highly skilled, aggressive bayonet fighters using the experimental system of bayonet fighting, the following suggestions and recommendations should be taken into consideration in conjunction with any training program. It is recommended that:

The bayonet training should be extended to include many more hours than are provided at present, since bayonet skills may save a life and since bayonet skills are the same as other physical skills and take a great deal of practice to develop and maintain a high level of performance.

Second, since the psychological advantage of Method "B" Guard position while advancing toward an enemy is recognized, the bayonet fighter should be taught to advance toward the fray with the rifle in the position of Method "B" Guard and then to raise the rifle to the position of Method "A" Guard when at close range. The theory being that if any intimidation is going to take place it will have taken place by the time the two opponents have reached bayonet range.

Next, that the "Spirit of the Bayonet" (FM 23-25) should be strongly inculcated into all bayonet trainees since there is no substitute for aggressiveness in bayonet combat, and that bayonet equipped rifles be used during physical drill training periods to accustom personnel to handling this heavy weapon.

Last, as a part of the bayonet training program, active combative practice using protective equipment and pugil sticks should be made a regular part of the program. One of the great weaknesses of present bayonet training is the lack of practice the bayonet fighter has against a live opponent wherein actual physical contact is made.

Now, what is the purpose behind this article? It is simply to present a case for a neglected weapon. It is not an outmoded weapon. It is only the method of employing this weapon which has become outmoded. As long as it is capable of taking an enemy life in close quarters combat or saving a friendly life under the same conditions, it is a weapon which should be considered and employed in its most efficient manner.

Infantry troops have not changed in the last 50 years nor has the mission of the rifle changed. We still have the rifleman and his rifle with a mission of occupying territory and destroying any enemy that might oppose him. It is only the method of employing the rifleman and his rifle that has changed to keep abreast of the times. So it should be with the bayonet. USMC

OPERATION BLUEJAY

By Col R. R. Van Stockum

UP NEAR THE TOP OF THE WORLD giant bombers, sleek jets and luxurious passenger planes take off and land on a two-mile runway built on perma-frost. There men have built a radio tower which is the second tallest structure in the world and have created one of the world's most modern air bases in the middle of the snow and ice of Arctic waste.



Between an Arctic dawn and a sunset they moulded a modern air base out of frozen wasteland

Why did the powers that be select a spot 900 miles from the North Pole as the site of one of the largest U.S. Air Force bases? A glance at the globe will show that far from occupying a remote position, in an air age, Thule is only 2470 miles from London and 3000 miles from Russia's industrial heart. It is actually a focal point for communications between North America and Europe.

But it is not intended here to discuss the strategic, diplomatic and geologic factors considered in the selection of Thule. This article will be concerned with one of the most important factors in its creation—how the men who built it and the materials they used were transported to the Arctic and landed there.

Complicating the tremendous physical task inherent in the construction of a major air base in the undeveloped Arctic 3000 miles from ports of embarkation, were special environmental problems of the objective itself. Consider the following: the ground at Thule is frozen solid the year around except for a 5-foot top layer which becomes boggy in summer; sudden windstorms in North Star Bay add to the dangers of grounding or of colliding with grounded ice; the sea approaches are usually frozen from late September to early July (early arrival entails a movement through the Baffin Bay Ice Pack; late departure imposes the hazard of freezing in) and hydrographic surveys in the narrow waters were incomplete.

Planning for this operation was not unlike that required for a conventional, large-scale overseas administrative lift. However, special consideration had to be given to the requirement, initially at least, of unloading over the beach; unusual hazards of operating amongst icebergs, bergy bits and brash ice; the joint nature of the operation which demanded the co-operation of all branches of the armed services with each other and with civilian contractors and the short period of accessibility of the objective by sea which compressed the planning period and limited the duration of the unloading phase.

The actual construction job was undertaken by a group of four contractors under the name North Atlantic Constructors. Over 300,000 deadweight tons were to be loaded aboard ship, transported to the objective and unloaded across a short and as yet undeveloped beach. In moving this tonnage to the objective, the Navy, in co-operation with the Army, would place ashore the tools, materials and supplies needed for construction and initial operations of the base. In addition to this basic task, the Navy would transport most of the laborers, mess and berth them afloat until the installation of barracks ashore, operate lighterage for the unloading and direct the harbor operations at the "port" of Thule.

Joint planning commenced in March 1951. Tentative equipment and supply requirements of the contractors were no sooner prepared than they became the basis for prior-



Unloading posed problems

ity orders to industry and for allocation of shipping.

Detailed loading plans were in some cases prepared for equipment which had not yet cleared the manufacturers' plants and whose exact dimensions and time of arrival were uncertain. Particular difficulties arose in completing stowage plans for heavy commercial construction equipment, such as 80-ton cranes, which had never before been discharged over a beach. It was necessary to co-ordinate the loading of all types of shipping—landing ships, amphibious transports, cargo ships and tankers—so that they could depart in time to arrive with their cargoes at the site in the desired sequence. This sequence was established first by the priority of requirement ashore, and second by the estimated capacity and capability of the beach at the time of the requirement.

All plans were contingent upon the arrival in the loading areas of the multitudious items in the proper quantity and at the proper time.

After a study of the break-up of the Baffin Bay ice pack and the history of shipping in the area, June 23d was chosen as the earliest possible date for the entry of initial shipping into North Star Bay.

In order to arrive at Thule on schedule, leading elements of the shipping were required to depart Norfolk early in June. The voyage was uneventful as these ships entered Davis Strait and continued north across the Arctic Circle. Gradually, the area of abounding icebergs, (glacial ice spewed into the sea from the encroaching Greenland ice cap) was entered. The radar picture reflected a confusion of targets.

A lead was finally discovered which, when exploited by icebreakers, enabled the initial shipping to infiltrate into North Star Harbor on 9 July.

An advance naval beach group, including underwater demolition personnel, had flown up early to chart the beach and in-shore waters and to erect hydrographic markers. Representatives of the Army Engineers had already established headquarters ashore and leading contractor elements had begun their surveys. A few huts could be seen clustered about the small Danish weather station on the desolate beach.

Routine replaced confusion



While hatch covers were being removed and booms being rigged in preparation for general unloading, representatives of the advance echelons came aboard the flagship to confer and plan unloading operations. The beach group delivered its beach sketches and briefed the admiral concerning local hydrography. Following these conferences on the day of arrival, a watch was established in the strategic plotting room of the flagship and general unloading was signalled. This station was manned 24 hours a day as the Unloading Control or Joint Lighterage Control Center from 9 July until discharge of cargo into lighterage was completed on 21 August. Some of the details of the unloading as controlled from "Strat Plot" will be discussed later. But first, it might be best to portray in general terms a few of the over-all aspects of the operation.

Army and Navy control personnel, beach groups, stevedores and boat crews worked around the clock, watch on and watch off. Relief was effected on station. Civilian construction crews worked 10 hours at a stretch and were divided into a day shift and a night shift, two hours being consumed in movements from quarters (initially afloat) to the job. Thus, all hands worked in excess of 70 hours a week with the midnight sun eliminating the reduced efficiency usually encountered in the graveyard shift.

Initially, unloading was out of landing ships and craft directly onto the beach. Heavy construction equipment, loaded in landing ships at Norfolk, rolled ashore over the ramps. By D+4, pontoon barges and causeway sections were in use as finger piers. On D+11 the first LST hulks were beached to replace these pontoons. Two days later the first section of a floating pier arrived in North Star Bay. The towing of hulks and pier sections is a story in itself which, when told, will be punctuated by dispatches such as this one from one tug skipper:

"RAN INTO SOUNDINGS OF FIVE FATHOMS X POSITION UNCERTAIN X NO SIGHTS OR AZIMUTH FOR TWO DAYS"

Shortly after arrival, a floatable fuel hose was employed to carry POL* pumped from tankers to temporary tanks ashore. Later this was replaced by a submerged pipeline, through which large tankers could discharge their cargoes with in-

*Petroleum, oil and lubricants used by the Armed Forces.

credible speed to huge permanent storage tanks.

On 15 July, the first of the cargo ships (Liberty and Victory types) arrived and the pace of unloading was stepped up. Thereafter, shipping was so scheduled that unloading could continue concurrently from seven cargo ship berths placed as close inshore as practicable. At the height of operations three LSMs were used primarily for transfer of Army and civilian personnel between the "barracks" ships (MSTS transports) and the shore, and LCVPs were used for personnel and administrative trips. In addition the following lighterage was available: 76 LCMs; 9 LCUs; 9 Pontoon barges (7 self-propelled) and 154 DUKWs (operated by the Army).

The scene ashore changed daily as equipment and the materials of construction were delivered to the site. Those concerned with the movement could take encouragement from the translation of their efforts in unloading into visible results ashore.

It might be appropriate to describe the procedures employed in the movement of such tonnages across a short stretch of beach. Operation Blue-Jay afforded a full test of general unloading principles for a fairly extended period.

First, let us follow the cargo from ship to beach dumps; then let us explain the control organization and its functions. Transportation Corps stevedores manhandled the cargo and operated the winches on board the Liberty and Victory ships. Cargo was swung over the side into lighterage, the type employed depending upon availability of craft and the nature of the cargo.

When the craft neared the beach they were directed to an available LST hulk finger pier by the beachmaster. On each finger pier were four unloading points, each consisting of a crawler crane and necessary shore party (Army) personnel.

At each unloading point cargo was hoisted out of the craft and onto flatbed trailers which were towed by rubber-tired tractors to the contractors' dumps.

DUKWs were utilized to carry specialized cargo, especially POL and asphalt in drums, direct from ship to dump. Moving like an army of ants between the anchorage and the dumps, they transported a surprising quantity of cargo, unloading a peak of over 3,000 tons for one 24-hour period.

Co-ordination of the movement was exercised by the control officer in the Joint Lighterage Control Center in Strat Plot. The Army requirements for boats were generated in the Army Bluejay CP ashore where close liaison was maintained with the senior engineer officer and the civilian contractors. These requirements were transmitted to Strat Plot as far in advance of the need as possible. Bluejay CP also directed the activities of the Army's equivalent of a shore party, including a reinforcing beach party element, to the end that operations ashore dovetailed with the unloading.

THE FUNCTIONS of the CP ashore, then, were to submit timely requests for lighterage, to direct the unloading at the beach and to assure the movement of cargo to the contractors' dumps inland.

The excellent communications afloat for unloading operations, both radio and visual, focused upon Strat Plot in the flagship. AN/TRC radio carrier equipment provided communications nearly as dependable as telephone between ship and shore.

The control officer in Strat Plot directed by radio the movements of various types of lighterage in response to the Army requirements received from the shore. Not only were requests of the moment translated into orders, but also requirements of the succeeding watch were translated into plans. As in any continuing operation, maximum efficiency demanded thinking ahead.

Each watch in Strat Plot consisted of three Navy or Marine Control officers, an Army liaison officer from the Command Post ashore, a status board operator, radio operators, and messengers. The senior officer directed operations, basing his decisions upon information reported to him from the ships over naval circuits and from the liaison officer

New assignment for UDT



The scene ashore changed daily



who was in touch with the Command Post.

Status boards were used to present a visual display of the up-to-date lighterage situation. Lighterage, insofar as practicable, was furnished in type and quantity to ships as desired.

Each cargo ship was provided with an Army "ship" officer who directed the stevedore gangs aboard. In addition, a naval officer was assigned as an unloading representative to report progress of unloading and assist the Army ship officer and merchant skipper as necessary.

Lighterage assignments to meet Army requirements were made in the following manner:

LSMs, employed principally in the movement of Army and civilian personnel between the barracks ships and the beach, were assigned to trips through the LSM division commander. As their requirements were fairly regular and predictable, they were largely operated on a schedule. LCUs were issued orders for individual trips through the LCU division commander. They were used principally to transport bulky, hard-to-handle cargo such as steel plates for fuel tanks and steel beams for hangars.

Self-propelled CB pontoon barges were dispatched by individual orders to the beachmaster. Occasionally supplemented by LCM-towed "dumb" barges, they were employed to carry much the same cargo as LCUs.

LCMs, the workhorses of the operation, received their orders through the parent or "mother" ship—transport or LSD. Once assigned to unload a cargo ship, LCMs continued to operate between that ship and the beach until otherwise directed. Assignments once made continued in effect as long as possible in order to reduce dispatch traffic and to facilitate the established routine. However, changes were effected at the expense of routine whenever greater efficiency would result.

LCVPs were used for personal administrative trips, scheduled shuttle trips and for temporary assignment to ships having no boats. Once schedules were set up, the operations of these craft, flying flags to designate the destination, brought back memories of the green and red water taxis that used to ply San Pedro Harbor.

DUKWs were manned and controlled by the Army, but assignment and operations of the DUKWs were co-ordinated in Strat Plot to avoid duplication and interference between them and other lighterage. The limited maneuverability and relative unseaworthiness of DUKWs demanded that they be given the right-of-way over all other waterborne craft.

LSMs and LCUs, by dividing their crews into two watches, were able to maintain 24-hour operations. Barges and LCMs utilized two crews each to facilitate continuous operations. Transports and LSTs pooled their available crews to provide maximum availability of LCVPs. Similar means were found to ensure full use of DUKWs when suitable cargo was available. Long, uncomfortable hours were spent in open boats in North Star Bay and valuable experience in ice operations was gained. Morale was high, for these crews could see constantly the results of their efforts. They knew also, as cargo ships rose higher out of the water, the end of their task grew progressively nearer.

Initially, radio traffic in Strat Plot was overwhelming and the control officers were snowed under with individual requests and queries. Here are examples from the "tear-off" file in Strat Plot:

"HAVE COOK WHO IS DANGEROUSLY BERSERK AND HAS LOCKED HIMSELF IN THE GALLEY X REQUEST MEDICAL OFFICER IMMEDIATELY X ALSO NEED TEAR GAS IF AVAILABLE IN AREA."

"ASSIGNED BERTH C5 X POPULATED BY 3 BERGS X ANCHORED C7 AT 152018R."

Eventually most problems were resolved, SOPs established and scheduled trips set up. The roar of dispatch traffic was throttled to a whisper and an atmosphere of orderliness prevailed. Each watch improved procedures over the one before so that routine gradually replaced confusion. Radios provided essential information or carried requests for decision. When questions arose relating ship movements to lighterage operations, the decisions resulting were co-ordinated with the staff watch officer.

Mimeographed forms were used to tabulate the requests of lighterage for personnel and cargo, and for the ready transmittal of the orders assigning such lighterage. Unloading progress reports were received hourly from cargo ships and summarized reports were transmitted by hand to the flagship at the end of each shift.

The first thick fog over North Star Bay forced the suspension of all boating for the short period of its duration. Subsequently, a standing operating procedure was evolved to allow nearly full-scale operations under all conditions of reduced visibility. This SOP included provisions for transfers of relief boat crews, hatch gangs and beach gangs.

Coxswains gained experience rapidly and demonstrated excellent ability in handling LCMs during these adverse conditions.

Shortly after the commencement of operations in North Star Bay, an abnormal amount of brash ice and bergy bits drifted in to clutter up the harbor to a greater extent than ever before witnessed so late in the season by the Eskimos at Thule. Efficiency of operations was considerably reduced, and a great number of bent or broken screws, shafts and rudders resulted. Calving and shifting of this ice imposed a constant hazard to small boats and required extreme care and caution on the part of coxswains.

The dangers inherent in the cluttered condition of the harbor were magnified by occasional high winds and fog. A combination of such conditions upon several occasions compelled the temporary retirement of the majority of shipping to safer ice-free waters.

However, the problems imposed by geography, hydrography and climate were overcome and the operations planned for 1951 were brought to a successful conclusion within the short shipping season of Northern Greenland.

On 21 August with only two cargo ships left to unload, the unloading could be considered completed. The coast guard icebreaker *Eastwind* departed "downhill" with its bullhorns sounding, "There is Nothing Like a Dame." The task-force commander directed the sailing of the remaining ships except for a small, rear echelon.

Between an arctic dawn and sunset a weather station with a modest air strip had been converted into a major Air Force base. American ingenuity had triumphed! USMC

Let's Learn To wRitE

By LtCol S. D. Mandeville, Jr.



You're not expected to be another Hemmingway. Just keep your writing clear, correct and to the point

IT'S TIME WE FACED THE FACT that as a rule Marine Corps officers do not write very well. Too few officers possess the ability to express their thoughts clearly on paper, or even to express them in grammatically correct form. If evidence is needed for the above statements the reader is referred to the nearest company bulletin board, the latest SOP published by his unit or to a file of Marine Corps Memoranda.

First, it should be made clear that in this discussion we are not concerned with the writing ability of those few Marines who expect someday to have their memoirs on the best-seller list, or those who have a yearning to become short story writers as an avocation. Nor are we interested in the ability of Marine Corps officers to adhere to the phraseology, terminology and format prescribed for official correspondence, orders and reports. But we are concerned with the ability of the average officer to draft in simple, correct and understandable form those papers which all officers are inevitably required to prepare: directives and

Keep one handy for ready reference

memoranda for companies, battalions and squadrons; staff studies, lectures and other instructional material; reports of exercises conducted or equipment tested; reports required as umpires, observers or inspectors; statements submitted in connection with accidents and investigations; letters to Marines' parents and other civilians, including Congressmen; and dozens of other papers which others will not be able to write for us.

The purpose of any writing is to express facts or ideas in written form in such a manner that the reader clearly understands what the writer intended to convey. All too frequently the written word fails to meet this basic requirement of good writing. Some of the common writing faults observed in material prepared by officers may be grouped as follows:

Ambiguity—This is perhaps the most common of all writing faults. We all have seen intelligent Marines, officers and men alike, place different interpretations on the meaning of some ALNAV or other directive from higher authority. Often commanding officers or staff officers feel it necessary to call a conference to clarify or elaborate on a directive just issued. The need for such a conference should be a warning that the directive may not have been too clear in the first place. When that "stupid fellow" on the other end of the line receives one of our reports or letters and asks for clarification or elaboration, it not only makes more paperwork for us, but also indicates that perhaps the original report or letter was ambiguous. Although ambiguity is probably the most common fault in our writing, it should be the easiest to correct. To achieve clarity of expression, the writer should avoid long and complex sentences. He should strive to use words whose meanings are specific and which convey exactly the thought intended. Careful reading by the originator of a paper for double meanings or equivocal expressions will eliminate much doubt in the mind of the recipient. In this connection persons engaged in any type of writing should keep a good dictionary handy for ready reference.* As an additional check, ask an associate or subordinate to scan your rough draft to see if your intended meaning is clear to him.

Rambling Writing—This fault occurs sometimes when the writer has little to contribute and is merely padding the document, but more frequently it occurs when the writer begins his original draft without thinking through what he really wants to say and in what order. Some writers include so much irrelevant information in their material that the reader becomes lost or side-tracked and consequently misses the main points. The principal offenders in this regard are the very conscientious who wish to insure that all facts and circumstances, however remote, are included; or the very careless who do not take the time or the interest to outline their thoughts in advance, or to edit their rough drafts afterwards.

Incompleteness—This fault usually occurs when the writer attempts to follow the military rule of making his writings terse, brief and concise. This is a good rule, but care must be taken that essential elements are not omitted from the paper. Conclusions and recommendations must be supported by the facts presented, and doubtful facts must be validated. The recipient must be given sufficent information to act intelligently on the recommendations received or the reports submitted. In many cases the originator, who has studied a particular subject and who has become familiar with the background and various ramifications involved, incorrectly assumes that the reader will have a comparable knowledge of the subject, and thus he will neglect to include all pertinent information required. Such writings do not achieve their objective and very often require further elaboration and explanation.

Grammatical errors — These are perhaps the least common of the writing faults committed by officers, but are the hardest to correct. Certain grammatical errors occur through carelessness and haste, and these are easily corrected by careful editing; but others result from the writer's inadequate knowledge of English grammar and composition. It is a delicate matter for officers to correct the work of their associates or subordinates when such corrections indicate that the author is ignorant of certain fundamental rules of grammar. But how else is the writer to recognize his shortcomings and take steps to correct them? The formal education of many officers was interrupted as a result of World War II

*Other suggested references: *Roget's Thesaurus of English Words and Phrases; A Dictionary of Modern English Usage,* by H. W. Fowler (N. Y., Oxford University Press); and *The Art of Readable Writing,* by Rudolf Flesch (N. Y., Harper).

and the Korean conflict. Others pursued technical courses in schools where little emphasis was placed on English grammar and composition. It behooves all of us, regardless of age or rank, to realize that we are deficient in this regard and take steps to train ourselves so that we can write and speak correctly without embarrassment to ourselves or to our associates.

The correction of most of our writing imperfections lies in placing more time and emphasis on writing correctly and expressing our thoughts clearly. Few of us possess the ability to write hurriedly with any certainty that our thoughts are expressed adequately and properly. Some of the most prolific authors reportedly spend hours, even days, revising and polishing paragraphs which appear simple in their final form. We cannot expect that words hastily jotted down on paper will properly serve their role as vehicles for our thoughts.

The average officer may find the following procedure helpful when drafting any document except the simplest report or order:

a. Carefully outline (mentally or on paper) the material to be written.

b. Prepare rough draft (s) of the document.

c. Critically edit the rough draft(s) for clarity, brevity, completeness and grammatical perfection.

d. Have an associate or subordinate review the final rough draft, checking particularly the points in "c" above.

e. Have the document prepared in final form.

If more emphasis is to be placed on good writing, the Marine Corps must provide training in this field. Immediately the cry will arise that such training would not contribute to the basic objective of military training, i.e., to prepare individuals and units for combat. But a great deal of our training is subsidiary to combat training and contributes only indirectly towards improving the effectiveness of individuals and units for combat. Included in this category is instruction in such subjects as law, accounting, administration and public speaking (or instructors' orientation courses).

The Marine Corps Schools should instill in all students, from Basic School through the Senior Course, the concept that the most brilliant officer is ineffective unless he can express his ideas in words, written or spoken. Within the past decade the Marine Corps has faced the problem of training officers and noncommissioned officers in public speaking and instructional techniques. Today, instructors' orientation courses are given at the Marine Corps Schools, at the Troop Training Units and even in some Fleet Marine Force units. Student officers at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces receive such courses.

BUT THE ABILITY of an officer to write is equally as important as his ability to speak. A few hours' instruction at the Marine Corps Schools outlining the most common writing faults, offering hints on style and composition and reviewing the most common grammatical errors would be time well spent. When appropriate, weight could be given in graded problems to clarity, brevity, completeness and grammatical form of the solutions.

To assure greater emphasis on proper writing in all commands, the impetus would have to come from Headquarters Marine Corps. Commanding officers and staff officers should be encouraged to review critically the written material prepared within their commands with the goal of improving their subordinates' writing standards. If individual officers were aware that this was a Marine Corps-wide program, there would be less hesitancy in reviewing critically the papers prepared by others, and subordinates would not be sensitive to constructive criticism in this regard.

All officers on active duty should be required to take a special correspondence course in English grammar and composition which could be offered through the Marine Corps Institute. Newly-commissioned officers should be required to complete this course during their first two years of commissioned service. The course should be relatively short and should be designed to achieve two objectives—a refresher for those officers who do not believe they need it, and a stimulus for further study for those who require it.

With more emphasis at all echelons on improving the writing ability of officers, and with a little training effort in this direction, the Marine Corps should be able to raise its writing standards to a level comparable with its standards of conduct, discipline and efficiency. US MC

Have an associate review the final draft



SACLANT

What's in a name? The navies of 14 nations, plying 32 million square miles of the Atlantic Ocean are all controlled by one man: Admiral Jerauld Wright

By Col Leonard M. Mason

SINCE ASSUMING MY NEW DUTIES I have been surprised at the blank expressions I see when I reply to the question, "Where are you on duty now?" To spare my relief such awkward moments, this article is presented on SACLANT. The military mind makes an "estimate" in solving unknowns. My experience to date indicates that far too little is known within the various military services concerning the NATO military set-up. So my manner of presentation will take the form of the end result of an "estimate": SACLANT — what, when, where, how, why.

Technically, SACLANT is an individual — in short, a man. Actually SACLANT is the short title for the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. In common, and incorrect, usage "SACLANT" is used to refer to the staff or headquarters of SACLANT. To be correct one should add "Staff" or "Headquarters" to "SACLANT" in referring to his place of duty. SACLANT's Staff is an integrated, combined international staff organized very much along the lines of any general staff. At this writing, this staff consists of 148 officers and 3 civilians. There are 192 enlisted attached to the Headquarters. An analysis of the directory of officers gives evidence of the integrated, combined, international aspect of the staff. Of the officers attached, 9 are Canadian, 2 Danish, 5 French, 4 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 3 Portuguese, 24 United Kingdom, and 100 United States nationals. There are 17 services represented by these officers but in keeping with the naval characteristics suggested by the geographic limitations of the command, the staff is predominantly naval.

Knowing that "SACLANT" correctly refers to one person let us examine the "what of SACLANT when incorrectly used to describe the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. The correct term to be used in this instance is Allied Command Atlantic, short title ACLANT. The Allied Command Atlantic, a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is the world's first international ocean command. Having briefly outlined the staff of SACLANT, let us look at the rest of the command. Here we come to the most unusual characteristic of this command. Although SACLANT is an operational rather than an administrative commander, there are no forces permanently attached to his command. Various NATO nations have earmarked forces which in the event of war, or for training purposes, will be assigned to his direction. So our remaining examination of SACLANT's command will consist of looking at the command structure rather than the forces to be assigned.

As previously mentioned, SACLANT's command is part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. So to fully appreciate the command structure one should have a quick look at the organization of NATO as it is today. From Chart I it is readily discernible that one of the underlying principles in the organi-



zation of the NATO command structure was one well known in democratic forms of government, i.e., military commanders are subject to governmental (political) direction. The various NATO governments appoint national representatives to the political agencies that co-ordinate and control NATO affairs. Political guidance is given these representatives by their respective ministers. The NATO military agencies receive their guidance on military matters of national concern from their respective national staffs. The political guidance required for strategic planning, direction and command of NATO forces comes from the political organization of NATO. Before going to the next chart it should be pointed out that NATO is more than a military organization. It is unnecessary to chart for this article the command structure of the civilian institutions of NATO. Suffice it to say there are very definite administrative and economic aspects. NATO leaders study the best way to build up the necessary forces, economic experts recommend how the industry and trade of the NATO nations should be geared to achieve the buildup of military forces.

Chart II shows the command structure of the military side of NATO. The Foreign Ministers of NATO countries make up the normal membership of the North Atlantic Council, making it in effect an international cabinet. The Council receives military advice and recommendations from the Military Committee, which is composed of one of the Chiefs of Staff of each NATO power. This is the supreme military authority in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Military Committee meets as often as may be necessary to give the highest military advice to the Council and to provide direction and guidance to subordinate military bodies. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the North Atlantic nations comprise the Military Representatives Committee. This Committee, sitting in continu-



CHART I

ous session in Washington, is able to provide the Council with continuous military advice which has been agreed to by all the North Atlantic military staffs. Without this committee many military matters would have to await a full meeting of the Military Committee.

The Standing Group, also in continuous session in Washington, functions as the agent and executive body of the Military Committee on certain subjects. It also acts as the steering and executive body of the Military Representatives Committee. The Standing Group is composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States (or when appropriate, the Chief of Staff from each country).

The Council has designated the Standing Group as the superior body to whom the Supreme Commanders are responsible. Military agencies other than NATO Supreme Commands receiving guidance and direction from the Standing Group appear at the next level on Chart II and no attempt will be made to elaborate on these agencies. To provide for the efficient operation of forces throughout the NATO region, Commanders were appointed for the following areas: European Command; the Atlantic Ocean Command; the Channel Command.

The Canada-U. S. Regional Planning Group is the only remaining box at this level on the Chart. This group performs its assigned tasks under the direction of the Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff. The geography, planning and bilateral defense arrangements of these two nations are such that it appears

neither necessary nor desirable at this time to have a NATO command for that region, hence this Planning group. Since we are primarily concerned with SACLANT and will give no more attention to the other commands except to mention one point of interest to Marines.

Not shown on Chart II are the following subordinate commands of SACEUR to which Marines are assigned duty: Commander in Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH) with headquarters at Oslo, Norway; Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) with headquarters at Naples, Italy; Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKFORSOUTH) with headquarters at Naples, Italy, a dual command responsibility.

SACLANT's command is co-equal and parallel to SACEUR's command and not subordinate to it. The command structure within SACLANT's command can be visualized without the aid of a chart. SACLANT is a United States Admiral, Deputy SACLANT is a United Kingdom Vice-Admiral. SACLANT at present has four major subordinate commanders. Three of these subordinates are Commanders in Chief: Commander in Chief Western Atlantic (CINCWESTLANT), Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT) and Air Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic (CINCAIREASTLANT).

The Western Atlantic Area is commanded by a United States Admiral and is organized under the United States concept of command, i.e., a single unified command of Army, Navy, and Air Forces assigned to the area. The Eastern Atlantic is organized under the United Kingdom concept of command, i.e., a joint command with a British Admiral and a British Air Marshal in the command positions.

The fourth major subordinate of SACLANT is the Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKFLTLANT). This force is SACLANT's main offensive capability and is built around fast carrier task forces. This Striking Fleet has no geographical area assigned to it in the command organization. It will operate as directed in any of the geographical areas of the Allied Command Atlantic. As United States law requires that the control of a force employing a United States atomic weapon must be vested in a United States Commander, the Strik-

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY MILITARY ORGANIZATION


NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
MILITARY COMMITTEE
MIL. REP. COMTE
STANDING GROUP
NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE
MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMMUNICATIONS AGENCIES IN EUROPE
ADVISORY GROUP AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH & DEV.
AIR TRAINING ADVISORY GROUP
SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
CHANNEL COMMITTEE
ALLIED CDR. IN CHIEF CHANNEL & SOUTHERN NORTH SEA
ALLIED MARITIME AIR CDR. IN CHIEF CHANNEL & SOUTHERN NORTH SEA
CANADA - U.S. REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP
OTHER COMMANDS WHICH MAY BE ESTABLISHED

CHART II

ing Fleet Atlantic is commanded by a United States Admiral.

Space will not be used here to discuss the various sub-areas of the Allied Command Atlantic or other organizational features planned but not yet firmed. So much for SACLANT's command structure as such. However, here is a good place to mention another aspect of command.

Ordinarily SACLANT receives his orders from the Standing Group. However, he has the right of direct access to the Chiefs of Staff of any of the nations involved in his command, and, as the occasions demand, to the appropriate Defense Ministers and Heads of Governments. In addition, all of the North Atlantic countries maintain liaison officers at SACLANT Headquarters who are responsible for day-to-day liaison with their Chiefs of Staff.

As a final note on command structure, it should be noted that all of the NATO powers are not directly concerned with the Allied Command Atlantic. The nations furnishing bases of operation and/or contributing forces to SACLANT as consistent with their own national and with other NATO commitments, are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States, ten of the fourteen NATO powers.

The "when" portion of the "estimate" is considerably shorter than the "what." The first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic was appointed on 30 January 1952. Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (United States) was the first SACLANT. He assumed command on 10 April 1952 and activated his command organization that date. Present commander, nominated in February, is ViceAdm Jerauld Wright, USN.

Headquarters of the Allied Command Atlantic is at Norfolk, Virginia. In the red brick buildings that were once the Norfolk Naval Hospital and which also house the Staffs of CINCLANT, FMFLANT and other Atlantic Commands, SACLANT's Staff makes plans that will affect ships, planes and men of many nations thousands of miles away. The geographical limits of the Allied Command Atlantic, broadly speaking, are from the North Pole south to the Tropic of Cancer and from the eastern shores of United States and Canada east to the coastal waters of Europe and Africa and to the 100 fathom curve around the British Isles.

To describe how SACLANT came into being we must take a look at the evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although SACLANT was not established until 10 April 1952, one might say it was conceived on 4 April 1949. On this date in Washington, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

This grouping together of nations with common traditions and common respect for the rule of law, in effect transformed the North Atlantic from a vast barrier dividing two continents into an inland sea of a closely-linked community. The North Atlantic Treaty is one of the shortest and clearest of international documents. It is an eloquent assertion of the faith and unity of free democratic nations.

The development of this Organization is a unique international experiment that has led to novel forms of associated activity on the part of member states. Initially the organization was formed around five Regional Planning Groups who were "to develop and recommend . . . plans for the defense of the Region." SACLANT's command evolved from the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group (NAORPG), one of the original Regional Planning Groups. The members of NAORPG included: Norway, Denmark, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Portugal, Iceland, Canada, and the United States.

By December 1950, planning had progressed to a point where a unified command in Europe was indicated. The Council at this time approved the establishment of NATO military commands; approved the appointment of a Supreme Commander Europe and agreed that a Supreme Commander Atlantic should be appointed as soon as possible. With the creation of SACEUR's command three of the Regional Planning Groups were absorbed.

The NAORPG continued with planning for the defense of the North Atlantic Region. The delay in the evolution of SACLANT's command can be attributed indirectly to the fact that the feeling of insecurity and urgency was more prevalent with regards to Europe than with the North Atlantic. However, a more direct reason for the delay in appointment of the first SACLANT was the change of command within the United States Navy as a result of the death of Admiral Sherman.

Agreement had been reached upon the appointment of Admiral Fechteler as SACLANT and the untimely death of Admiral Sherman resulted in considerable more "red tape" with its ensuing delays. However, agreement was finally reached and

SACLANT flag—

the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group was phased out of existence with the appointment of SACLANT.

Why is there a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic? To answer this question one must first answer related questions such as: "Why any commander for the Atlantic?" "If a commander for the Atlantic is required, why not several instead of just one?" "Granted one commander for the Atlantic, what is he supposed to do?"

In answering the first question, "Why any commander for the Atlantic?" one must recall that SACLANT is a military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that the military aspects of this organization are purely defensive in nature. Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that the parties will undertake certain peacetime measures "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to

resist armed attack." One need not be a military strategist to appreciate that there are three phases or steps that must be taken by a defensive force in overcoming an offensive force: 1. Stop the offense; 2. Build up strength for your own offensive; 3. Attack and defeat the enemy. In the event of armed attack against a NATO country an armchair strategist can conclude that the people on the spot must execute Step 1 and stop the enemy. The NATO has the Allied

n 24 hours a day

Command Europe on one side of the Atlantic for this purpose. Supplies and reinforcements for military operations in Europe must cross the Atlantic. Therefore the Atlantic plays an important part in all three steps to be taken by a defensive force. Supplies essential to the support of the civilian economies of the countries concerned must also cross the Atlantic.

Just what is this "Atlantic" we speak of? Of course it is the Atlantic Ocean, but have you ever stopped to think that although the oceans are the broad highways over which flows most of the world's commerce, no one nation exercises sovereignty over the high seas?

Connecting this thought with the above discussion on the importance of the Atlantic to the NATO gives us a lead as to why there is a need for someone to command the Atlantic Ocean Area. It would be foolish to assume that an enemy of NATO would not appreciate the importance of the Atlantic Ocean and utilize submarines, ships, mines and aircraft to his best advantage in the Atlantic. SACLANT's primary mission is to keep the ocean highways or sea and air lines of communications open, i.e., deny them to the enemy and ensure their unrestricted use to NATO nations if war is forced upon them.

If the NATO powers cannot control the Atlantic, the execution of the three steps to be taken by a defensive force would be problematical. As presently organized, we can visualize in time of war against NATO the ships of all friendly countries crossing the North Atlantic protected by the fighting ships and aircraft of eight navies fighting a common battle against a common enemy. To avoid waste and confusion at sea the actions of these naval forces must be co-ordinated. This in itself suggests but one commander for the Atlantic Ocean Area. However, the over-riding reason for one commander was a military one that grew out of experiences of the last world war.

Abiding by the old adage that experience is the best teacher, NATO planners were insistent on one commander for the Atlantic Ocean Area in order that the anti-U-boat campaign would avoid the pitfalls of the last "Battle of the Atlantic." Records of the last war are pointed reference to the fact that the enemy submarine is a deadly foe that must be dealt with by all available forces.

Now to get more specific and answer the question: "Granted one command for the Atlantic, what is he supposed to do?" We know that SACLANT's primary job is to keep the sea lanes open, but just what does this entail? Ten of the NATO countries are concerned directly with the Allied Command Atlantic. Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Luxembourg, in view of their geographical position, are indirectly concerned.

Without a centralized authority there would be ten different plans, each with its own national interests uppermost. Some one agency must consider the overall civilian and military requirements, which often compete with each other; assess these requirements; solve the maritime problems and provide the means of winning the battle at sea. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic plays a very important part in assisting the North Atlantic Council with this difficult task.

In SACLANT we have one commander, with the interests of NATO as a whole uppermost in his mind, assessing the overall requirements for his theater of operations and submitting his plans to a single military authority under the North Atlantic Council. Part of the "nuts and bolts" of SACLANT's job that should not be overlooked by the reader is the problem, caused by the international aspects of his command, of providing mutually understandable signals, codes and ciphers, recognition procedures, search and rescue doctrine, gunfire support and air defense rules and many other details necessary for the ships, submarines and aircraft of eight nations to operate together in the same ocean.

It is not to be implied that SACLANT solves all of these problems himself. The Military Agency for Standardization (see Chart II) plays an important part in the solution of these matters but they are all problems facing SACLANT.

We might sum up "SACLANT — what, when, where, how, why" in one sentence by saying: SACLANT is the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, appointed 30 January 1952, with Headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, by the NATO, to provide for the unrestricted use of the Atlantic Ocean by NATO powers in event of armed attack on a NATO country. USMC

in brief

First military aircraft of its type, the XV-1 Convertiplane, (right) recently developed by McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, employs a pressure jet unit on each rotor blade tip for vertical flight and a pusher type engine for forward flight.

A hillside monument in tribute to the Marine Corps (right), has been restored by Marines participating in Lant Traex 2-54 maneuvers on Vieques, Puerto Rico. The monument was originally constructed by Puerto Rican laborers in 1938 in honor of Marines scheduled to arrive for training in the Caribbean.



Major General R. McC. Pate, Commanding General of the First Marine Division in Korea, (below) gives a congratulatory pat to "Able," the Korean shepherd adjudged "Best of Show" in the division's recent dog show. His owner and handler, Pfc Ronald V. Forte of the Bronx, N. Y., stands by proudly, holding the gold cup "Able" earned.

Lieutenant General Guy G. Simonds, Chief of General Staff, Canadian Army (right), climbs aboard a Marine HRS Sikorsky helicopter at MCS Quantico during his recent visit. General Simonds visited Quantico to observe training facilities.

A new and improved version of the "C" ration, which will be packed in a flatter, more rectangular package for easier handling in the field, has been developed by the Army Quartermaster Corps. The revised ration will include: beef and peas with gravy, chop suey with meat, ham and potatoes, fruit cake, pound cake, cookies, soup, gravy base and soluble tea. Delivery dates are expected to start sometime next month.

Major General Merritt A. Edson, USMC (Retired), President of the Marine Corps War Memorial Foundation and General Lemuel C. Shepard, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, (above) join in breaking ground during an impressive dedication ceremony for the bronze replica of the famous flag-raising on Iwo Jima. The memorial will be erected on the Nevius Tract next to Arlington National Cemetery.

Gratuitous copies of Robert Sherrod's *The History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II* will be sent to anyone who earned a combat star while serving with Marine Corps aviation units during World War II. The next of kin of those killed in action are also eligible. To obtain your gift copy send name, serial number, units with which you served and the dates of attachment and detachment to: Major Edna Loftus Smith, USMCR-W, Room 5E567, Op-52, Pentagon Building, Washington 25, D. C.

America's first water-based turboprop transport, the Convair-built Navy R3Y Tradewind (right) recently took off from San Diego Bay on its maiden voyage. The 22,000 horsepower, 80-ton high-speed transport left the water in less than 30 seconds and remained aloft for more than two hours during her shake-down.

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, President of Nationalist China, inspects the Marine Honor Guard, (right) aboard the carrier USS *Wasp*, during her recent Formosan visit while in Far Eastern waters.

The revolutionary X-1 "Minisub" will be completed within two months, it has been announced. The small sub will be operated by one man but it will have a crew of several others. The new craft will be capable of planting atomic mines in enemy harbors and launching or steering guided missiles.

Marine Master Sergeant Verl K. Nelson (left) prepares to shove off on an escape and evasion problem conducted by AirFMFPac and their East coast counterpart, AirFMFLant. High in the Sierra Nevada mountains, pilots and air crewmen were sent through aggressor-infested territory in simulating conditions that might be encountered after being shot down behind enemy lines. The operation was considered a success.

A new system of bayonet fighting, capitalizing on the natural instincts of the individual, is being tested by the G-3 Special Training Section at Parris Island. (See *Close For The Kill* on page 12.) The new system has had great success over the old method in actual tests held at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot.



Convair

a force-in

We must never falter in our efforts to h

day-to-day increases in our skill . . .

readiness to meet any challenge—

By LtCol H. W. Edwards

THE DATE WAS SEPTEMBER 15, 1950; the place, Inchon, Korea; the occasion, the landing of the 1st Marine Division in an amphibious operation that precipitated the retreat of the North Korean Army and would have been instrumental in ending the Korean war but for the intervention of the Chinese Reds.

For a victory-starved United Nations Army, the success of this operation was electric news indeed. For the nation which had seen its amphibious force, the U. S. Marine Corps, reduced to a mere 74,279 personnel by successive cuts in appropriations, it meant a reaffirmation of the historic Marine Corps mission, to provide a force-in-readiness. The amphibious spearhead had not become blunted!

How often in the history of our country have shortsighted economies resulted in a call to arms being answered by too little and too late! But in July of 1950, when the Chief of Naval Operations queried CinCPacFlt as to when a Marine regimental combat team could be made available, the response was most reassuring — 10 days if shipping was available. This peace-strength regiment with brigade staff constituted the nucleus of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. It was virtually the entire force at Camp Pendleton, California, at the time and it was a combat-ready outfit. Armed with this knowledge, General Douglas MacArthur was able to secure Joint Chiefs of Staff approval for the commitment of the brigade with supporting air to Korea.

It was not the intention to commit the brigade initially but the desperate situation in the Pusan perimeter changed the plan so that the Marines landed directly at Pusan on 2

readiness

stronger through

efficiency and overall

Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.



August and were in action on 7 August, the eighth anniversary of another famous fire alarm, the landing at Guadalcanal. Just one month had passed since the date of activation.

Meantime, General MacArthur had dispatched a request to JCS for a full Marine division with appropriate supporting air components by 15 September. It seemed incredible that a war-strength division consisting of 24,394 Marines (which included supporting force troops and service units) could be furnished within six weeks. Especially since

the 1st Division had been reduced to a strength of 7,779 and the 2d Division was down to 8,976 Marines. Only slightly less bleak was the picture presented by the aviation component. An aircraft wing meant 4,000 personnel whereas 8,846 comprised the total force of both Marine aircraft wings in existence at the time, and these were widely deployed.

General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., then commanding FMFPac, accepted the assignment without the slightest doubt that it would be accomplished. The story of that accomplishment brought new and dramatic eloquence to the phrase that has become familiar to every Marine's ears, "force-in-readiness."

The movement of the brigade from Camp Pendleton left the 1st Marine Division with approximately 3,400 officers and men remaining. With these as a nucleus, two infantry regiments were formed in the short space of 27 days, plus two battalions of artillery and a battalion of tanks in addition to motor transport, signal, service, shore party, ordnance, medical, engineer and headquarters personnel. Augmentation, to make this possible, came from several sources during the period July 31 to August 10. The 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune contributed 6,831 men, the 1st Replacement Draft, 812; posts and stations throughout the world, 3,630; and finally the Organized Reserves, over 10,000. The latter have been aptly named the "Minute Men of 1950!"

The build-up of aviation strength was simultaneous. Here again, we found the Organized Reserves filling the gap so that altogether some 6,300 air, as well as 33,000 ground members of the Marine Corps Reserve, were called to extended active duty to meet the mobilization requirements imposed. All of this was accomplished in about one month.

The material readiness of 98.3 per cent for the division and 95.6 per cent for the air wing, in spite of appropriation economies, was an important factor in mounting out and a solid indication of the thoroughness of Marine Corps planning. That kind of preparation is what makes a force-in-readiness.

The Organized Reserve lent itself well to this type of employment for several reasons. First, it was of large size which meant that the active-duty Marine Corps, though shrunken by budgetary limitations, possessed a great potential of available manpower. Second, this manpower was capable of quick employment, as evidenced by the actual speed of mobilization. Considered in the light of the speed required by the unanticipated mobilization for Korea, this was an extremely valid test of the Marine Corps Reserve's availability. Third, their high quality and diversified training and skills enabled them to be readily integrated into the regular establishment in all types of duty and with nearly as much "know-how" as their regular comrades. This achievement was made possible by stressing the amphibious mission of the Marine Corps Reserve in both home armory and summer camp training. The gap from home, school and business to the beaches of Inchon was thus bridged by preparation born of experience.

Acme

An RCT ready in ten days

Santo Domingo: "Banana Wars" kept the force on its toes

The 1st Marine Division (less one RCT) achieved war strength in 16 days' time, and one month later, on September 15, executed the amphibious landing at Inchon on schedule. The 7th Marines (reinforced) landed six days later. General MacArthur's plan, conceived in July, became reality in September. For the major part of the division there was not even time to stop off in Japan for some shakedown training as originally planned. There was only time in Japan to convert from commercial loading to combat loading during the period 28 August to 12 September. Meantime the 1st Brigade, which was to be part of the landing force, could not be spared from the Pusan perimeter fighting until midnight of 5 September. The Herculean task of reorganizing and re-equipping personnel, servicing of all vehicles and integrating the 3,000

members of the Korean Marine Regiment into the Marine organization was all accomplished on time.

Staff work was considerable for as difficult an amphibious operation as Inchon. Invaluable assistance in this matter was given by Colonel Edward H. Forney's team from Troop Training Unit, Pacific (PhibGruOne) which was attached to the X Army Corps for the landing. Complicating factors in planning included: one of the largest tidal ranges in the world, tortuous approach channels, extensive mud flats off-shore at low water, a restricted choice of landing beaches and the outlying island of Wolmi-do commanding the entire area. A city comprising a quarter million people had to be seized in the initial beachhead. Naval and Marine planners had 24 days to plan the operation, make all preparations, embark and move the landing force to the objective area.

As might be imagined, the execution of these plans was no mean feat either. It called for precise coordination by naval and landing elements with the tidal schedule. It called for a landing on Wolmi-do in the morning to furnish fire support for landings on the mainland in the late afternoon, thus providing the enemy with a 10-hour warning. It called for the use of scaling ladders to scale a 16-foot seawall. It called for the beaching of landing ships loaded with critical supplies immediately after the landing. In short, it called for an amphibious operation of the first magnitude without sufficient time for rehearsal, reconnaissance, detailed planning, or integration of untried personnel.

Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, Commander PhibGruOne, concluded in his report on the operation that successful assault could have been accomplished only by the United States Marines because of many years of specialized amphibious training in conjunction with the Navy. Only Marines had the requisite "know-how" to formulate the plans within the limited time available and to execute these plans flawlessly without additional training or rehearsal.

As commanding general of the landing force, General Oliver P. Smith spoke for the valuable contribution made by the Marine Corps Reserve when he said, "Without [them] the Inchon landing on September 15 would have been impossible. . . . They needed no particular refresher course to renew the amphibious skills they had learned during World War II. . . . [They] were quickly integrated into the division . . . with as splendid a Marine spirit as the regulars."

Here, then, was the up-to-date realization of the concept of "the force-in-readiness" which has been the Marine Corps' watchword over the years.

The concept, no doubt, started with the early ships' detachments which were always available as boarding parties and landing forces. It has been said that the distinction between a privateer and a man-o'-war was that the latter had a Marine detachment aboard and consequently the ready force of disciplined and highly trained troops needed for any emergency afloat or ashore.

History records numerous small landings by Marine detachments afloat, often expanded by consolidating several detachments into a single landing force. By such means were the Marine landing forces assembled for the Bahamas expedition in 1776, the Mexican War, the Civil War and various naval campaigns during the present century.

Up to the time of the Spanish-American War, the ready force had invariably comprised ships' detachments. However, on April 16, 1898, a battalion of Marines with organic artillery was organized under command of LtCol R. W. Huntington as a special landing force for duty in Cuba. This battalion sailed six days later and, upon landing, seized and defended Guantanamo Bay against a force of Spaniards many times its size. The success of this first operation involving a specially tailored landing force of combined arms was a significant milestone in the development of a Fleet Marine Force.

Indeed, from these humble beginnings, expanding as they did to include all the weapons of modern seapower and naval aviation, together with landing forces of combined arms, do we see the genesis and evo-



Marines in China—an antidote for trouble



1950: a brigade in a hurry

lution of the balanced fleet that has made our nation a first-class naval power. A force-in-readiness to put out a fire before it could become a conflagration was the achievement of all of these landing forces. In recognition of this fact, John Nicholas Brown, former Assistant Secretary of Navy for Air, in committee hearings before the passage of Public Law 416, said in effect that the Marine Corps' salient contribution historically has been as a national force-in-readiness. For this reason, the need for Marines will always be proportionately greatest when the other armed services are at low ebb. As the other three services mobilize, the need for Marines returns to normal.

"If there had been 5,000 Marines under my command at Manila Bay," said Admiral George Dewey, "the city would have surrendered to me on May 1, 1898 and could have been properly garrisoned." Thus did Admiral Dewey voice the sentiment of many naval strategists who read the lessons of the Spanish-American War and understood the value of a ready force.

It was his opinion that the Marine Corps could render its best service to the country by providing the Navy with a small, highly-trained striking force maintained in a state of readiness for the accomplishment of naval objectives in time of peace or war.

The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was established at Olongapo, Philippine Islands early in 1901 for the purpose of landing and establishing an advanced base on the China coast should it become necessary. To this end guns and mounts were prepared, mines and torpedoes were readied and all preparations made in order that at the shortest possible notice a base could be mined, fortified and defended on some part of the China coast. The base was not established in China, but for several years the Marine brigade at Olongapo remained in a state of readiness to do so. And a new development of naval war, the advanced naval base, became a reality.

Out of this requirement was developed the Advanced Base Force of 1910-1917, followed by the East and West Coast Expeditionary Forces of 1920-1932 with their co-ordinate Marine air arm.

In 1920, in testimony before Congress, MajGen John A. Lejeune cogently outlined the Corps' mission when he said, "There is always the danger that the next war may burst upon us as suddenly as did the last war on England and France. . . . As these expeditionary forces of Marines are intended for service with the fleets they must be kept in a similar state of readiness." This concept finds expression today in the National Security Act of 1947.

"Four tasks for the Corps"

During the era 1900-1934, trouble spots developed in many places—China, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vera Cruz, Santo Domingo, Haiti. All of these got the same antidote of Marine preparedness. The appearance of a small force immediately, often precluded prolonged action by larger forces. This type of action served to mold the pattern of amphibious force development during crucial years of trial and error.



Wide World

For the new FMF—its own air

It fell to the lot of Major General Commandant John H. Russell to put the much discussed concept of a ready force into more definite form. With a request to the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter dated 17 August 1933, General Russell wrote as follows: "The U. S. Naval Policy assigns the Marine Corps four (4) tasks. The fourth and most important of these is to 'provide expeditionary forces in immediate readiness,' . . . The fleet, representing the first line of national defense, must be maintained in a constant state of readiness for war. That part of the Marine Corps that is to support the fleet must be in a similar state of readiness. . . . It is therefore recommended that the Marine Corps be authorized to discontinue the term, 'Expeditionary forces' as applied to these troops and substitute instead the title, 'Fleet Base Defense Force,' or 'Fleet Marine Force'."

The CNO, Admiral W. H. Standley, concurred by letter in October 1933 in which he expressed "the hope and expectation that eventually the Marine Corps will be in a position to maintain at Quantico and San Diego the full Fleet Marine Force available at all times for operations with the Fleet, and under full control of the Commander-in-Chief."

World War II—a force-in-readine

Navy Department General Order No. 241 of 7 December 1933 carried out this expression and gave material form to the concept of a Fleet Marine Force as a force-in-readiness for service with the fleet.

It quickly became apparent that to station a substantial force of Marines in a base camp with a mandate of immediate preparedness required that they be divested of normal base duties of the housekeeping and security variety. This led to the establishment of Marine Barracks organizations as a separate and distinct

command at installations where FMF troops were located. It meant that a divisional force could train around the clock without continually losing the services of battalion-size working parties, or could embark aboard ship without any serious disruption to the administration of the base. A rotation of individual Marines between the two organizations insured that all hands received the full benefit of amphibious training required of every Marine.

Annual fleet landing exercises over the years 1935-39 maintained the amphibious force in a high state of training for its primary mission in spite of critical reduction in size.

Amphibious staff planning at the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia, made full use of the experience gained from fleet exercises. Methods of naval gunfire and air support during landing operations, logistics and communications for the ship-to-shore movement, and organization of highly mobile base defense units were crystallized into doctrine and published in manual form so that uniformity of training and performance could be achieved. It was this doctrine which made the force-in-readiness a highly specialized team combining all available weapons for the most critical phase of modern warfare, the ship-to-shore movement. It was this effectiveness that later caused the famous British military writer, General J. F. C. Fuller, to describe it as, "In all probability . . . the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war."

rce-in-readiness led the way

Iceland became a focal point for the Marine Corps in June of 1941. By direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and with no advance warning as to place of employment, the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) was formed on June 16, 1941 and sailed less than one week later. No other military organization was prepared to carry out such a directive in the time allotted. This was a classic realization of the fruits of preparedness and augured well for more serious tests to follow.

Never found wanting

It is interesting to compare this operation with a similar opportunity which England had in 1940 to wage a naval campaign to save Norway from the Germans. Lacking a powerful naval air force and a readily available fleet Marine force, the results were tragically different. Secretary of Defense James E. Forrestal summarized the lesson when he stated: "This disaster which profoundly affected the course of the entire war, was more than the failure of 16,000 men, but was a failure in the exercise of sea power on the part of the largest navy in the world, and it was entirely due to the lack of a small specially-trained amphibious force such as we have in the form of the United States Marines, to supplement ashore the action of the fleet at sea."

Culebra: 1923-24

To be sure, the operation in Iceland was not made against enemy opposition, whereas the movement to Norway was. But the similarity arises when one considers that the Marines traveled as a normal wartime convoy prepared for any eventuality upon landing. On the other hand, the British had an interval of more than six weeks in which to reinforce the Norwegian garrison from the time German designs became known, and they had the protection of their own fleet and air arm to insure success. This period of indecision was characterized by unwillingness to take a risk, over-supervision by Admiralty, contradictory instructions from the Army and Navy, faulty co-ordination between the attack force and landing force commanders, failure to exploit an advantage and lack of an adequate landing force.[1] These considerations lend weight to Secretary Forrestal's observations.

There was little reason to indicate this nation was prepared for an offensive maneuver during the early months of World War II in the Pacific. However, our war strategists felt that we must seize the initiative from the Japanese. To the 1st Marine Division went the assignment with scarcely a month's warning. Since that 7th day of August 1942, Guadalcanal has become a household word. The effect of the Marine landing was to upset completely the Japanese timetable and plan for conquest and to reaffirm the value of a ready force for waging a naval campaign.

An interesting word-picture of the Guadalcanal task force is painted by Dr. Samuel E. Morison in the following passage: "There was little time for planning this important operation, and little enough to do with — South Pacific sailors nicknamed it Operation 'Shoestring' — but almost the entire Expeditionary Force managed to assemble at a mid-ocean rendezvous on 26 July, at a point about 400 miles south of the Fijis. Some 75

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1 "*The Norway Failure*" by Major Carl W. Hoffman, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, September, 1949, page 24.

ships were there, 'loaded with rude humanity, trained only for fighting and destruction,' as Parkman said of Wolfe's force that captured Quebec in 1759. What better phrase for United States bluejackets and Marines!"[2]

IN RECOGNITION of the requirements and capability of the Marine Corps to provide a force-in-readiness, the National Security Act of 1947 spelled out the Marines' primary mission in the following language: "To provide fleet Marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign."

A secondary Marine Corps mission is still that of acting in response to directives of the President with small, highly mobile and well-trained task units capable of rapid and diverse employment mainly in support of U. S. foreign policy. This is perhaps best exemplified today by the presence of a Marine infantry battalion with fleet units in the Mediterranean.

Consider, then, this balanced-fleet concept which set up the requirements for a naval landing force-in-readiness. To this add the earlier mission of the Marine Corps "to perform such other duties as the President may direct," as provided by an Act for Establishing and Organizing a Marine Corps in 1798 and reaffirmed by the National Security Act, which is quite unlike any comparable language used in respect to any other service. Garnish these considerations with a tacit assumption, sanctioned by custom, that Marines, as transitory naval forces, could land on foreign soil without the implication of international hostilities and permanent occupation associated with an invading army. The blend established the Marine Corps as a force-in-readiness and set the pattern for Marine "fire brigade" actions in various places throughout the world.

The Congress has recently seen fit to increase the capability of the Marine Corps as a force-in-readiness by insuring a minimum of three divisions and three air wings. However, this vote of confidence would have been lacking if it had not been justified by results of some 280 landings performed by the Marines in execution of their duties as instruments of national policy.

Today the force-in-readiness aspect of the Marine Corps is one of the major requirements for the existence of the Corps and, indeed, a formidable weapon in the American defense arsenal. To have a force of combined arms with its own aviation component trained to carry out, on short notice, the mission of a landing force in a naval campaign is an invaluable weapon to the United States. The commitments this nation has as a result of NATO agreements are such as to require speedy execution, and quite likely by amphibious maneuver. Future operations may well make Inchon appear, in retrospect, as a mere dress rehearsal, but the quality of that performance will always loom large as a deterrent to any aggressor.

The fact that this ready force has been repeatedly tried and never found wanting has earned for the Marine Corps a universal respect. The prospect that it will answer many alarms in the future with equal success is one that continues to occupy the full attention of defense planners who have interpreted the painful lessons of history that reiterate the value of a force-in-readiness.

US MC

3d Mar Div in Japan: training continues on the slopes of Mt. Fuji

[2] *The Struggle for Guadalcanal* by Samuel Eliot Morison, Vol. V of the *History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II.*

KOREA AWARDS

Navy Cross

Pfc Jon D. Adams, Pfc Richard J. Adams, Cpl Elmer R. Betts, Jr., Cpl Crayton L. Caldwell, TSgt Joseph W. Dailey, Capt Ralph F. Estey, 1stLt David K. Fauser, 2dLt Frederick E. Hillard, Pfc Walter P. Johnson, 2dLt Donald F. Lambert, 2dLt William J. Livingston, Capt Herbert M. Lorence, Pfc Robert D. Kohler, 2dLt Patrick T. McGahn, Jr., Capt John B. Melvin, 1stLt Anthony G. Morrison, 2dLt Benjamin H. Murray, Cpl Franklin D. Roy, Capt John H. Slusser, Sgt James W. Stephen, 2dLt John E. Watson, Pfc Vance O. Worster.

Distinguished Service Medal

BrigGen Robert O. Bare.

Silver Star

Pfc Angelo T. Afilani, Jr., Pfc Lusio C. Ahumada, 2dLt John W. Alling, Jr., Pfc Robert C. Arlington, Pfc John Breske, Jr., Pfc Robert G. Burns, Pfc Aubrey D. Carroll, SSgt Willard "A" Covert, 2dLt William H. Cowie, Jr., 2dLt Robert C. Craig, Pfc Charles L. Crockett, 2dLt Richard F. Daley, Pfc Donald E. Flagg, Pfc Lanty R. Frame, Sgt Marshall L. Garst, SSgt Frank A. Gatz, Capt Daniel P. Gillow, Jr., 2dLt Paul R. Giordani, Sgt Robert T. Herold.

Sgt Robert W. Jamieson, Pfc Robert W. Jansen, 1stLt Harold A. Johnson, 2dLt Edmund E. Johnson, Pfc Lambert A. Jordan, Jr., 2dLt Hunt S. Kerringan, Pfc William R. Laundry, Sgt James J. Martindale, Sgt Timothy F. McCarthy, Sgt Ray A. Norris, Pfc Richard V. Parker, SSgt Manuel Perez, 2dLt William R. Phillips, Sgt Marcus V. Rankin, Sgt Max K. Reynolds, MSgt Charles J. Rhodes, Pfc Sirio A. Ricci, Cpl Richard F. Schuckman.

Legion of Merit

Maj George K. Acker, Maj David V. Carter, Col Manley L. Curry (2d), LtCol Lowell E. English, LtCol James H. Finch, Maj Joseph E. Fogg, Col Glenn C. Funk (2d), Maj Walter R. Harris, Col Thomas S. Ivey, Col Robert J. Johnson, Col Kenneth D. Kerby, BrigGen Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr., Col Walter R. Lytz (2d), Maj John N. McLaughlin, Maj Maurice C. Pulliam, Capt Adolph G. Schwenk, Col Arthur R. Stacy (2d), Col Alexander B. Swenceski, LtCol William O. Thrash (2d), LtCol Francis "X" Witt, Jr.

Distinguished Flying Cross

Maj William I. Armacost (2d), Maj Vernon E. Ball (2d), SSgt William D. Bennettson, Maj Carol Bernard, 1stLt Marvin L. Brill, Capt Nelson E. Brown, LtCol Leslie T. Bryan, Jr., Capt Carrol B. Burch, SSgt Robert B. Caldwell, Maj Christopher M. Canan (4th), LtCol Marion E. Carl (5th), Col Edward B. Carney, Col Owen A. Chambers, 1stLt Richard Chynoweth, Capt William E. Clark, 1stLt David A. Clark, Capt Clinton O. Erickson, Capt Austin C. Fitzgerald, Capt Donald E. Frary.

2dLt Richard N. Gehrsitz, Maj John H. Glenn, Jr., Capt Harold F. Hagans, Capt Arvid D. Larson, Capt Dean W. Lindley, Capt Melvin E. Locke, TSgt Robert E. Lorch, LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (3d), Capt James C. Madigan, IV, Maj James H. Magill, Capt Charles L. Manley, Maj Samuel J. Mantel, Jr., Capt George W. Martin, Maj Alton W. McCully, 1stLt Robert L. McElroy, 1stLt Robert C. McKay.

1stLt Robert W. McPherson, Maj Jonathan D. Mendes, Capt George R. Miller, Maj Joseph A. Mitchell (3d), Capt Thomas G. Mooney (2d), LtCol Arthur M. Moran (3d), MSgt Leo S. Morin, Capt Raymond W. Mullane, 2dLt Charles E. Pangburn, Capt George B. Parker, 2dLt Frank E. Petersen, Capt Donald C. Potter, Maj Richard E. Pryor (2d), SSgt James L. Pryor, Capt Douglas A. Riddle, Capt John T. Ryan, 1stLt Louis W. Schwindt, Capt Lee L. Scott, Jr., Capt James W. Shank, Capt Harold L. Sharkey, Col Arthur R. Stacy.

2dLt Thomas F. St. Denis, Maj Louis H. Steman, Capt Warren S. Stevens, LtCol Lynn H. Stewart, MSgt James M. Stickland, Capt Harry B. Stucky (2d), 1stLt Leonard R. Tait, 2dLt Iver W. Trebon, Capt James Q. Van Ry, Capt Martin T. Wagenhoffer, Maj Eugene A. Wailes, Capt Charles E. Webb, Capt Melvin L. Whitefield, Maj Royce M. Williams, Capt Frank L. Williams, Jr., Cpl Donald F. Williams.

Navy and Marine Corps Medal

Cpl Charles Baldridge, Sgt Conrad E. Bjorkman, Jr., 1stLt James P. Connolly, II, Sgt Harker Dale, Pfc Harold F. Erichson, Capt John P. Flynn, Jr., TSgt Leo J. Hertzog, Pfc Donald L. Hunter, TSgt James R. Oswalt, Pfc Millard L. Sutton, Pfc John A. Turchetta, Cpl Frederick N. Van Zant, TSgt Leonard C. Waibel, Sgt George R. York.

Bronze Star

Capt Robert B. Allen (2d), Cpl Arne A. Berg, Cpl Norman R. Bodway, Maj Richard L. Braunn, Maj Edmund Buchser, Jr., Pfc "J" "G" Carbaugh, Pfc John L. Carver, Jr., LtCol Kenneth R. Chamberlain, Sgt Fred D. Chadwick, LtCol Hugh J. Chapman, 1stLt Rodney J. Christensen, LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr., SSgt James T. Clunie, 1stLt Whitney L. Cochran, LtCol Thomas M. Coles, 1stLt Jack W. Conrad, 1stLt John F. Conroy.

Sgt Bernandino Correia, LtCol Francis K. Coss, Pfc Garner W. Crowder, 1stLt Francis Cushing, SSgt Richard Dalzell, MSgt Kenneth F. Dayton, Pfc Orville Delano, TSgt Roy J. Dorsett, Jr., SSgt John P. Driver, Cpl Francis X. Dugan, Maj Elswin P. Dunn, 1stLt Lawrence E. Fellows, 2dLt Joe H. Fox, TSgt Willis E. Garrison, Pfc Clarence Gibson, Maj Richard M. Giddens, TSgt William M. Givens, 1stLt William R. Grubaugh, Capt Murray V. Harlan, Jr. (2d), Capt Esmond E. Harper.

Maj Milton D. Hill, Capt Edward Y. Holt, Jr., 1stLt John R. Hooton, 1stLt Robert W. Howland, Sgt Carl E. Hudson, Jr., Cpl Armand A. Iannicchери, Cpl Richard D. Ihnken, Sgt Albert L. Ireland (2d), LtCol Russell L. Janson, Cpl Carl G. Johnson, Sgt Gordon Johnston, Maj Mark Jones, Capt Coleman C. Jones, 2dLt Joseph S. Jordahl, 1stLt Howard V. Jordan, Jr.

Pfc Marion L. Jordan, SSgt Joseph S. Kassebaum, Cpl Ralph King, Cpl Gilbert E. Kunze, Pfc Manuel C. Magallanes, Pfc Daniel F. McCarthy, Sgt Ellis R. McDonald, Cpl James H. McDowell, Sgt Harold W. McElroy, 1stLt James B. McMath, Pfc Joe Meave, Jr., Sgt Edward L. Meeks, MSgt Mike D. Mervosh, Pfc Roger C. Miller, Sgt John C. Milner, Maj Joseph R. Motelewski (2d), Pfc Thomas M. Nestor, Jr.

Cpl Robert W. Neumann, Pfc Dell Newstrom, TSgt LaVaughn Newcomb, 1stLt William K. Nicrosi, Jr., Pfc Michael J. Nigro, Jr., Pfc Thomas T. Noecker, Sgt Joe U. Ogden, Jr., 1stLt Robert W. Oliver, 2dLt William M. Oliver, 2dLt Carl Omasta, Cpl John Orth, Cpl Ronald P. Osinski, Sgt Nicholas J. Outrakis, 1stLt Guy C. Packard, Maj Mauro J. Padalino, Maj John H. Paetow, Capt Harry F. Painter, 1stLt Oswald O. Paredes, Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr., Pvt Charles R. Parker, Jr.

Cpl Willis D. Pepper, Pfc Edward B. Perrine, Cpl Arthur J. Perry, LtCol Tillman N. Peters (2d), SSgt Pierre B. Peterson, Pfc Albert R. Peterson, Pfc Angelo J. Piazza, Capt Jay V. Poage, Capt Robert J. Post, SSgt Adrian R. Poulin, Col Edgar O. Price (3d), 1stLt James W. Quinn, Pfc Antonio Quiban, MSgt Willie R. M. Tucker.

on location with FEX

A company field exercise can't be planned and organized while the troops are taking a break



By 1stLt James F. Kingsley

THE COMPANY COMMANDER SAT musing over the training schedule and finally called for the executive officer. He nodded as the Exec entered.

"I see by the training schedule that we have a problem coming up tomorrow . . . 'A, C and Weapons... 0730 to 1600 . . . platoon in the attack . . . area G-1' . . . Now, I've got to sit on a court in the morning, but I can come out later with the chow truck. Do you think you can get it going, Lieutenant?"

"Yes sir, Captain. I'll take the troops out and get it all set up as soon as we get there . . . while the men are taking a break. What area was that again, sir?"

"G-1. Same old deal. No strain."

. . . And so the field exercise is prepared, a phase of the schedule on which the rifle company spends — or wastes — well over half of the training hours in a year.

The company-grade officer, to whom my points are addressed, should be able to recognize whether this kind of hurried, last-minute, think-it-up-as-you-go-along method of planning for field work is happening occasionally, happening often or becoming SOP in his company. If it is happening at all it is time to execute, or at least recommend, a better system.

The first requisite of a system is to have someone in charge of it. Between the CO and the Exec there seem to be two full-time jobs. We have discovered in our company that

the only workable solution is to recognize the two jobs as separate and to assign them as such. In our case the Exec trains—the CO administers the company. The company commander observes, monitors, corrects and critiques, but the actual execution of the battalion training schedule is the Exec's job except for field exercises involving company-level tactics.

What is the Exec's system? It begins on Thursday afternoon with the receipt of ten copies of next week's schedule. Other pressing matters become secondary. He sits down and begins extracting the company's mission for next week out of the jumble of columns.

The simple act of rewriting the information on an acetate-covered board blocked off with date and time groups is important. It acquaints him with the schedule and makes him think about it . . . "let's see . . . let corporals teach the .45 . . . better get Hayes to run flash and sound for the whole company," and so on.

Later in the day there will be a meeting. It's SOP for Thursday afternoons and all platoon leaders and staff NCOs know they must be there. The meeting lasts about half an hour.

Every hour on the schedule is assigned to someone. The training officer doesn't just recommend references in field manuals, he distributes appropriate manuals on the spot as he makes the assignments. He distributes the assignments on three bases: persons who are schooled or talented in a particular subject, equitable division of work and on the basis of decentralization. Each phase of training is done by the lowest echelon which can do the job efficiently.

Next, lesson plans must be prepared but the job is done painlessly. The training officer has prepared a large stack of mimeographed lesson plan forms. They are worded so that they can be used for field problems, lectures, or combinations thereof. For each assignment he makes, he writes the assignee's name on the top of such a form and hands it to him (or to his platoon leader) with instructions to return it completed no later than Saturday noon. The assignee merely fills in the blanks. He finds, upon having done so, that he has been forced to organize his material so thoroughly that further preparation is merely the final gloss. All administrative details connected with the problem or lesson are considered, and when the completed form is handed back on Saturday morning, the training officer may correct certain details, make further recommendations as to the conduct of the lesson, take cognizance of all training aids and special gear which the assignee has requested on the form, and procure this gear for him.

This procedure, I believe, is as

leak-proof a method for assigning field exercises and lectures as any that can be undertaken with practicality by a rifle company. Now, down to field exercises in particular:

Personnel assigned to conduct field problems are given a longer period of grace to return their field exercise plans. This is because there must be at least one preliminary reconnaissance of the area on which the problem is to be run before the plan can be completed. It should not be necessary to emphasize the absolute need for "on location" planning of *all* field exercises. This does not mean "while the men are taking a break." It means that the training officer must arrange with S-4 for jeep transportation to the area no later than the day before the problem is to come off. Besides giving verbal instructions to the personnel concerned, he publishes the exact time for this trip on his acetate "ouija board" as a constant reminder and an actual part of the week's schedule.

FIELD PERFORMANCE MEMORANDUM

J. D. Green Sgt.
(name and rank)

1st Plt 5 Aug 53
(unit) (date)

Five-par. Order	8
Tactics	9
Control	6
Aggressiveness	9
Individual Conduct	9
Total	41
Average	8.2

Signed R. J. White

"... *an old standby* ..."

Let us assume that the exercise is one in platoon tactics and the training officer has assigned himself to the job.

Two days before the problem he jeeps to the training area with all key company personnel who can be spared from whatever is going on that day (except, of course, the rifle platoon leaders). It is vital that the NCO or officer in charge of the aggressor detail be one of those present.

Arriving at the area, they dismount, blink, and look blankly at the terrain (getting tactical vision seems much like getting night vision).

"Flatter than a pancake," the machine-gun platoon leader may mutter. "That little shack is about the only clearly defined objective in the area — what do you say we work up one problem around it and rotate all the platoons through it?"

"Don't think so," says the training officer. "I agree with you on finding out the objectives first and then working out the problems backwards, but I think we can find more than one objective if we look hard enough. Everybody knows you can't have skyscrapers all the time — a "clearly defined" objective may be clearly defined in itself, but it may also be a pretty nondescript place which the platoon leader defines clearly to the troops in his order — but okay, let's use the shack for a starter."

The training officer sizes up the terrain around the shack. To the north there is all woods. To the south and east there is scrub pine, with heavy woods beyond. To the west there is scrub pine, a hard-top road, more scrub pine, a large clearing, and heavy woods.

The best approach seems to be through the heavy woods from the north, but the training officer selects the more varied terrain to the west as the most educative for problem purposes. Considering the time limits on the problem, he decides to set the LD some 700 yards to the west, which will force the attacking platoon to change its formation several times while on the move, besides giving them an exercise in road-crossing. He asks the machine gun platoon leader to scout the area for other objectives, while he and the gunnery sergeant begin walking the terrain toward the tentative LD.

On the edge of the clearing nearest the objective there is a small copse of scrub pines.

"Gunny," says the training officer, "spot some of your aggressors here. one fire team. You might tell the BAR man to open fire just as soon as he sees a good target."

"Right, sir. Do you want them to pull out or stay here?"

"Tell the fireteam leader to start timing the attacking people with his watch once the BAR has opened fire. If he gets assaulted within five minutes, which he should if they are aggressive, tell him to allow himself to be overrun, but if it takes longer than that, tell him to pull out through that brush at the end of five minutes."

The gunnery sergeant notes these directions on his pad. "Clear enough, they shouldn't foul that up. Good thing," he nods, "having a little intermediate objective like this. Gives the men a proper set mind. Are you going to warn the platoon leader about this?"

"Yes, I'll include it in the situation."

The training officer's point in this instance is that the one-objective problem, so common nowadays, is simply begging the squad, platoon or company to relax upon the objective.

If the spirit of constancy in the attack is as essential as tenacity in the defense — if infantry units are to be discouraged from the false notion that they can expect to relax upon each single laurel — then field problems down to the smallest level ought to encompass more than one

"C" COMPANY
1st Battalion, 6th Marines
2d Marine Division, FMF
Camp Lejeune, N. C.

3 Aug 53

LESSON PLAN
FIELD EXERCISE PLAN
(To Be Completed and Returned to XO)

SUBJECT: Platoon in attack

INSTRUCTOR: Lt. Jones

ASSISTANTS: Lt. Smith, Lt. Brown, T/Sgt. Black

DATE-TIME: LESSON FROM 0815 TO 0915, 5 Aug 53 (DATE)

EXERCISE FROM 0930 TO 1515, 5 Aug 53 (DATE)

PLACE: (TA COORDINATES IF IN FIELD) Area P-3 (TA9130F)

UNIFORM: B-2 w/COMPASSES, HELMET COVERS GREEN SIDE OUT

UNITS PARTICIPATING: Company minus 60MM mortars

NUMBER PARTICIPATING: 190 (aprox)

REFFRENCES: (1) LPM, Chapter 10, section IV
(2) FM, 'Rifle company, Infantry Bn.

TRAINING AIDS DESIRED:
Blackboard, chalk, eraser, four maps (1:12,500) of maneuver area

OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS

TRANSPORTATION: Jeep to bring blackboard

RATIONS: Hot chow at 11:30 for 195 men at TA9130F5

AMMO: 4 clips per rifle, 3 magazines per BAR
1 belt per LMG

COMMUNICATIONS: all plts except LMG bring AN/PRC-6

LESSON OBJECTIVE:
To summarize 3 previous lectures on plt tactics; to exercise plts in all phases of attack

LESSON OUTLINE:

LECTURE

① Introduction (0815-0825)
A. Orient men on problems

② Summarize approach phase (0825-0835)

③ Summarize troop-leading steps (0835-0845)

(Use Reverse Side If Necessary) (over)

The instructor merely fills in the blanks

objective. The second objective pressures the attacking unit to reorganize quickly, plan in haste and move out again under probable enemy observation.

When the training officer has decided upon his LD, zone of action, assembly area and drawn a sketch of the entire problem site, he has completed a fraction of the necessary preparation. He must yet find objectives conducive to good problems for two more rifle platoons. If the terrain is monotonous and objectives scarce, he may use a good standby technique — he may pick a poorly defined objective, call it a bivouac area, and plan to have the attacking platoon reconnoiter it by patrol as a part of the problem prior to the actual jump-off. Here is a case where the easy method is probably the best, but it should not be relied upon often, because owing to the time limitation the tactical exercise of the platoon is severely shortened as it waits for the patrol to return. However, this method may well be used to tie up phases of instruction, particularly if there have been recent problems in scouting and patrolling.

Upon returning to the company area, the training officer (since he has assigned himself the problem) carefully completes his lesson-plan field-exercise plan book. Under the items Training Aids Desired and Administrative Details he contemplates the so-called "small things": blackboard, chalk, jeep for transporting blackboard, sketches, maps, overlay paper, ammo, radios, rations, flashlights, brush hooks . . . and under Equipment—compasses, entrenching tools, belt suspenders—whatever the troops must have.

The heading—Units Participating—brings other thoughts to mind: tie the company weapons into the problem? Use them as aggressors? Give them much-needed gun drill? There is an answer to fit each type of field work, except for one constant factor — there must always be aggressors. Often the regimental S-2 section is happy to perform in this capacity, thus leaving the company weapons free for more useful and pertinent training.

Number Participating often brings on the headache of an under-T/O company. Combine them into a couple of T/O platoons so that the platoon problems won't look like "squaddies"—or retain unit integrity, however skeleton-like, so as to exercise the junior NCOs? There is room for a good debate here, but this writer prefers the second alternative. The first method breaks down the real, though intangible values, of stable organization, inter-platoon rivalry and smooth functioning through habit, besides leaving some leaders out of the problem.

Upon completion of the FEX-plan

and pre-arrangement of all details emanating therefrom, the problem may be said to be fully prepared.

Although preparation is three-fourths of the effort, the time spent in it may be needlessly wasted unless the actual running of the problem is carefully supervised. Supervision consists of indoctrinating, controlling, evaluating, and critiquing. Briefly and in order:

Indoctrinating: If a lecture is given on the location prior to the problem, give it as much thought and preparation as a classroom presentation. First tell the men in a general way what is to be done, then direct all your points to the job at hand. Create a feeling of immediacy. Now is the time to sum up troop-leading steps, reduce previous lectures down to bare statements, render your favorite tactics-in-a-nutshell maxims, remind them of past mistakes and emphasize their weaknesses. This kind of talk brings previous academics into simple, ready-to-use focus.

The enemy and friendly situation you have created should be so believable that you believe it yourself. Make it a complete one. You are a commentator setting the scene for a drama. This is easy. Since troops in the field are usually highly motivated and readily accept the dimension of combat, you don't have to be an Orson Welles to make the most of this spirit.

Controlling: The ideal ratio for control is one administrative person for each tactical squad. In a platoon problem, one person might travel with the platoon leader, another might view the maneuver from the aggressor side, another might stand back and get a bird's-eye picture. These positions are listed in the order of preference. If you are to give an intelligent critique on how the unit acted you must know *why* it acted that way in the light of whatever information it had to act upon at the time.

Do not give tactical orders. Instead of saying, "Get some flank security out," say, "What if a machine gun opened up from that brush on the left?" and let him figure out flank security for himself. Don't save up all the leader's mistakes for critique. Indirect advice such as this, rendered under the pressure of the problem, is like a "pony" referred to in an examination; it will be remembered long after the marks have been out. The writer has often knelt behind a bush with an inexperienced NCO and whispered, "Now, what is your first troop-leading step?" and with the impatient squad waiting behind him, required him to recite it painfully (even if it took many minutes) and execute it — then the second troop-leading step, then the third. This will succeed where forty hours in a classroom may have failed.

Do not exercise any more control than is absolutely necessary to save the problem from complete ruin. But if the problem suddenly ends up in complete ruin, do not hesitate to make the unit run that phase — usually it is the assault phase — over again. Even when tired and extremely uncomfortable, the men will want to retrieve their lost pride. It is always necessary to end the problem on a note of success.

If you are travelling with the unit, be tactically co-operative. Do not give away its maneuver by making noise or showing yourself.

Evaluating: A system of evaluating field performance which the writer had an opportunity to use at the 2d Division NCO Leadership School proved an excellent way of showing personnel their weaknesses, strong points, and day-to-day improvement.

The system is readily adaptable for use in a rifle company. It consists of an old standby, the performance memorandum. Leaders and individuals are graded on the spot on mimeographed chits. There is space for a mark on Control of Unit, on Five-paragraph Order, on Tactical Plan, on Aggressiveness, and on Individual Conduct. The maximum grade for each item is ten, and the total of the five grades is divided by five. If only three items are marked, the total is divided by three. The chit will mean something to the man concerned even if only one item is marked.

If the chits are cut to hip-pocket size, and each administrative head carries a small book of them at the ready during the course of a problem, it should be no trouble to mark each and every NCO, whether on one item or five. One advantage of the system is its privacy; it does away with having to bawl out an NCO in front of his men at the critique.

These chits are, I believe, superior to the performance memoranda used (at least formerly) at Quantico, because they are more detailed and provide a concrete basis for grading.

Critiquing: There must always be a critique, and it is best to do it on the spot. A critique should never be all-bad or all-good if the problem has been controlled properly.

If several platoons or squads have been operating in the same general vicinity, bring them together after all the problems are over so that each can enjoy vicariously, the successes and failures of the others. In a company-sized critique there is often much discussion of principles arising out of a particular situation, by men who weren't on the scene.

A recommended method of critique is to let the control personnel make the opening remarks, then call on the leader of the aggressor detail for his point of view, then let the troop leader try to vindicate himself. The senior officer should moderate and conclude the discussion.

There is a natural tendency for officers to see and critique a problem in terms of leadership. This is necessary, but not always helpful to the majority — the men who have gone just as far and worked just as hard. Emphasize individual movement, response to the control of the fireteam leaders . . . let everyone who has something to say, say it. A private will often have much worthwhile on his chest; let him have his say.

Above all, save the best news for last. Your men should never go home feeling they have flopped. They will feel this way if you chew on them for an hour and then tack on an empty compliment, figuring you have done your duty by ending on a positive note. The fakery in this is too obvious.

Properly prepared and properly controlled, every field exercise will unfold a genuine achievement, a tangible advance beyond the problem run yesterday or last week. It is the training officer's job to insure that this actually happens. If he is an officer with energy, common sense and a good system, the sky will be the limit of his rifle company's proficiency in the field — and it necessarily follows, of its pride, morale and self-confidence. USMC



PROPS FOR THE 'PROF'

By TSgt Lawrence L. Toolin

THE JOB OF TEACHING IS A fascinating one, but at times it can be provoking. Why will one student grasp a point in one hour's instruction while it takes 10 hours to get the same point across to another man? Why will one man pick up instruction quickly at the beginning of a course and then bog down half way through?

There are many reasons for the differences in learning capacities of individuals. Some men have higher IQs than others and it's seldom that you find two men who have the same educational backgrounds. Then too, there are psychological reasons too numerous to mention.

In the Marine Corps, at some time or another, it falls upon all of us to become instructors. The subjects may range from teaching a group of recruits the position of a soldier at attention to instructing field officers in high-level staff work. Whatever the subject, there will always be some who grasp the subject quickly and those who will lag behind. But if an instructor should find that a large percentage of the class is not grasping the fundamentals, then it is time for him to overhaul his teaching methods.

In the Navy of the last century, the accepted principle of instruction was known as "Each one, teach one."

Troops sleeping through your lectures? Shake the dust from those training aids and wake 'em up . . .

Under this system, whose modern counterpart is the coach-and-pupil method, a new man was placed in the care of a more experienced man. It was a highly effective method for years and it is still good but it requires two major factors — time and many capable teachers.

Today we are pressed for time, in most cases, and capable instructors are limited in number. The teachers we have are presented with the problem of conveying much material to a great number of men in a short period of time.

Faced with this situation, it is obvious that the coach-and-pupil method is not practical. Therefore, in most cases our instruction takes the form of the lecture. Unfortunately, the lecture is not the best method of teaching, but when a great amount of material must be presented to a large group in a short period of time it is the only really practical method of instruction.

Since we must use the lecture system there are many factors entering into the presentation of a good instruction period that should be examined. The most important of these, I feel, is the use of the support weapons of the classroom — training aids.

First, what is a training aid? Basically, a training aid is any device that catches the eye and holds the interest of the student. These support weapons of the classroom give depth to instruction by capturing the imagination of the students. They add another dimension to the lecture by making the audience utilize more of its senses. In addition, a training aid increases the ability of the student to remember material presented.

Training aids come in four general categories: projected aids, two-dimensional aids, three-dimensional aids and audio aids. We shall go into each of these a little more fully below.

Projected aids are motion pictures, strip films, slides and projected opaque materials. All of us are familiar with the training film, which has been used and abused more than any other aid in the catalog. In general, motion pictures are available in color and in black and white, on practically any known military subject. These 16mm films are invaluable as a supplement to instruction, and would be hard to replace. They cover tactics and techniques that would be difficult or impossible to show in any other way. Unfortunately no film, no matter how good it is, can replace good instruction.

Strip films are available in most training aid libraries. These films provide ready-made charts, diagrams and pictures on 35mm film. They cover almost all military subjects, and have the advantage of being less in demand at any given time. The projector used with this film is so simple that anyone can operate it with a few minutes' practice, thereby obviating the necessity of arranging for the services of a projectionist. No darkened classroom is required, as long as a flat, light-colored surface is available for use as a screen.

Slides are similar to strip films, except that each picture, or "frame," is independently mounted. The same projector is used for slides and film strips.

Through the use of the opaque projector, any number of charts or pictures up to nine inches square may be shown or enlarged upon any flat, light-colored surface much in the manner of the magic lantern of bygone days. In the absence of suitably large charts, whole pages, or any part of a page from appropriate field manuals may be projected. The value of this feature should be immediately apparent to instructors.

There are other projection-type training aids which we will not go into here, but your training aids library can bring you up to date on many of them.

Among the *two dimensional aids* is the reliable blackboard. Any classroom without a blackboard is like a car without a spare tire — it's never missed until it's really needed, then it's too late. The blackboard gives the instructor the ability to appeal to the sense of sight, through simple sketches, or key words written on it that he wishes to impress upon the memory or to illustrate a point.

Demonstrations: eye-catching and interesting

In addition to the blackboard there are many graphic training charts, both factual and appealing to the eye, prepared by the armed forces development centers for distribution. If no prepared charts are available, your training aids library can usually make one to your specifications. If not, a few minutes devoted to applying crayon to wrapping paper will result in a satisfactory aid. As an example: project a picture from a field manual through the opaque projector, then simply trace the picture with your crayon. With absolutely no artistic ability, you have created a duplicate of an approved picture from your reference material. A little sincere effort and imagination can do wonders.

Three-dimensional aids include all

models, mock-ups, cutaways, and most important, the actual item. Could you teach machine-gun drill without a machine-gun, or nomenclature and field stripping without a rifle? Obviously not. Therefore the use of the actual articles makes them training aids. Three-dimensional aids are excellent, since, to sight and sound, they add the sense of touch and the all important process of student application.

Add to your list of training aids the sand table, for your small unit leader orientation courses and for critiques. A few minutes of preparation will save many hours of training time that might be spent in unnecessary travel.

There are many prepared three-dimensional aids available, ranging from the simple recognition models to the complicated five-times-normal working models of infantry weapons. No instruction is complete without application, therefore the use of the three-dimensional aid is imperative.

The last category is the *audio aid*. Probably the weakest point in the use of the audio aid is that it appeals to only one of the senses. But, don't discard it! In your training schedule have you considered broadcasting battlefield sounds over a public address system during a squad problem? The novelty of this new approach will add an unusual touch to a routine training problem.

Also, there are many orientation talks, similar to radio programs, that may be broadcast through your barracks public address system. These provide the entertainment of a well planned radio program, in addition to their training value. Subjects run the gamut from Communism to field sanitation, and hold their greatest appeal in the novelty of their presentation. Other uses of audio aids are limited only by your imagination.

To supplement the short list given above, consult the training aids librarian on your post. He will be more than happy to help someone who is sincerely interested in getting an hour's worth of learning from an hour's teaching.



Adapt aids to the instruction — not vice versa

The greatest pitfall to be avoided is building a lecture around a training aid, rather than selecting an aid to fit the instruction. The first big step is a thorough preparation of subject matter through study of approved references and by careful observation of the tactics or techniques to be taught. When the instructor feels that he is prepared, and has his complete outline of instruction, then, and only then, does he analyze his lesson plan to find the weak points. Every weak spot is a potential spot for a good training aid — to demonstrate, to explain, to clarify the point. If an aid is obsolete, or presents false or misleading information, it must be discarded entirely. An instructor who is forced to apologize for his training aid is losing, rather than gaining, the interest of the student.

If a motion picture is the aid selected, the instructor must preview the film before class many times — as many as necessary to thoroughly familiarize himself with its contents. When using the film in the presentation, the instructor *must* introduce the film. This is highly important, because the students' minds must be prepared to receive it. Parts of the film of special interest to the class must be emphasized; parts that do not apply must be minimized. Incidentally, it is never necessary to run the complete film if only a few minutes of it are sufficient to illustrate the point. It does no harm to start or stop the film at any point in its length, and it is extremely wasteful of valuable training time to show portions of films that are not pertinent to the instruction at hand. At the conclusion of the film the instructor must summarize and reemphasize the points brought out in the film. If it is apparent that a large portion of the class missed the point, the film must be run again.

When using a chart or the blackboard, one primary consideration is the visibility of the chart, or the writing on the board. Students in the rear quickly lose interest in material that appears to have been prepared only for the benefit of the students in the front. If complicated sketches are to be put on the board, have them on the board and covered before the class arrives. They can then be uncovered at the most effective time in the lecture. If the drawings are to be developed as the lecture progresses, have an artist sketch them on the board in pencil for the instructor to trace in chalk. The pencil marks cannot be seen more than a yard away, and the student is impressed by the instructor's nonchalant competence.

In conclusion, remember that there are many valuable aids to instruction that are gathering dust because of the lack of interest among too many of our instructors. Consult your training aids librarian for further instructional aids, explain your requirements, and follow his recommendations. Fit the aid to your instruction, and use the aid that supplements your lecture best. Use your instructional support weapons — use your props. USMC

the Anti-

By Col J. C. Murray

Synopsis:

The three-year conflict had drawn out since 1946 with the guerrillas, lightly equipped and unimpeded by territorial responsibility, holding the initiative.

As long as the guerillas tailored their tactics to the forces and arms at their disposal they held the whip-hand. But when they established the "Provisional Democratic Government" and tried to hold ground to protect their supply routes they were doomed to failure.

In addition to their tactical blunder, the guerrillas received another heavy blow when Tito split with the Cominform, and finally closed the Yugoslav border to guerrilla traffic.

In the meantime, moving slowly, the Greek Government had marshalled its forces and with material aid and military advice from the United States and Britain had finally built up its forces to 265,000 well equipped troops. Even so, the war dragged on because the Government forces lacked cohesiveness and their movements were marked by indecisive action.

Then in 1949, General Alexander Papagos came out of retirement to accept the post of supreme commander of Greek land forces. Seven months after his appointment the war was at an end.

Bandit War

The terrain and an open frontier to Yugoslavia were the guerrilla's two greatest allies, but Tito closed the frontier and the Greek Government carried the war to the mountains

Part IV

DISPOSITION OF FORCES

THREE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS enter prominently into a consideration of the disposition of forces. These are the frontier, the mountains and the sea. The influence of the sea and its importance as a means of communication are discussed later. The frontier may be regarded as the source of the war as well as the greatest ally of the "Democratic Army" in prolonging it. The mountains, too, were an asset of inestimable value to the guerrillas. Without them the war in Greece could scarcely have been sustained.

Frontier

Between the Dardanelles and the head of the Adriatic the coastline of Europe is either mountainous or a narrow coastal plain backed by mountains. There are few passes through the mountains, and the ports owe their importance to their position near passes which connect the hinterlands with the traffic lanes of the Mediterranean. As land routes leading to the Adriatic from Bulgaria and southern Yugoslavia are long and poor, these countries seek an outlet to the nearby Aegean. By its possession of Macedonia and Western Thrace, Greece controls these natural traffic routes. Consequently, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have always cast envious eyes on the ports of Salonika and Alexandroupolis, on the valleys of the Axios and Strimon and the Monastir Gap.

The Soviet Union, too, is interested in this area. The Sovietization of the central Balkans would be of greater value to the USSR if the productivity of the region were fully developed, and this would be aided by access to the Mediterranean through the nearby Aegean ports. More important, however, bringing this coastline within the Soviet fold would isolate Turkey from Europe and make it easier for Russia to achieve her ancient ambition of gaining free access to the Mediterranean by seizing the Dardanelles.

The present northern frontier of Greece is a composite product of the first and second Balkan wars, the Greco-Turkish war, World War I and the subsequent treaties. It has almost no desirable characteristics. From an ethnological standpoint, there are seeds of discord in the racial minorities scattered throughout the area.

The weakness of the frontier from an economic standpoint lies in the fact that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are interested in free access to the Mediterranean. Bulgaria in particular seeks access to the Aegean coast. Militarily, the present frontier completely satisfies no one. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria tend to regard the coastal region to the south as a bridgehead of their security zones. Was not Salonika used as a base for an expeditionary force of 700,000 during World War I, and were not plans made for its use for that purpose during World War II?

From the standpoint of the Greeks, defense of the frontier is a Herculean task. From the Adriatic to the Turkish border the frontier measures more than 700 miles. If Greece's eight wartime divisions were disposed along the border, the average divisional frontage would be nearly 100 miles. But its length is only a part of the problem. The trace of the frontier, running from one end to the other through a maze of mountains, has no defensive strength. To the north lie other mountains permitting defense on successive positions, but the coastal plain to the south affords no such possibilities. Thus, the historic routes between the Aegean and the central Balkans which cross the frontier in the valleys of the Strimon and the Axios and at the Monastir Gap, prejudice defense of the frontier from the south far more than from the north. Long and defensively weak, the border is also inaccessible. Except near the routes just named, it is remote and communication with it is almost nonexistent. Orthodox military formations cannot operate there and mountain units can move and be supplied only with difficulty.

An additional disadvantage to the Greeks in defending the frontier is that the eastward projection has no depth. The sea coast lies only a few miles from the frontier, and in this region lateral communications on land are limited to one road and one railroad, both vulnerable to attack.

Relations between Greece and adjacent countries

North of the frontier lie Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, all of which

came under Communist domination following the withdrawal of the German occupation forces. Relations between these countries and Greece were not harmonious following the war. Bulgarian troops had occupied Greece during the war and post-occupation feeling was high. Communists in all three satellites were contributing to the unrest in Greece in order to expand the sphere of the Cominform. In July 1945 the three satellites simultaneously unleashed a propaganda campaign directed at Greece. The Yugoslav Government sent a strongly worded note to the Greek Government denouncing imaginary violations of the border and cruelties to Slavs in Greece. Shortly thereafter, Albania presented a similar note relating to the Chams in Epirus. As these actions seemed to indicate the existence of a plot against the integrity of the frontier, the Rightest press of Athens responded with claims on the territories to the north.

On July 9 the Yugoslav and Albanian Governments formed a treaty of alliance. Communiques issued at the time indicated that it was directed primarily against Greece. As this agitation went forward locally, the USSR, as a propaganda move, introduced the Greek problem to the Security Council of the United Nations by a complaint that British troops in Greece were endangering world peace. Following rejection of this protest, the Ukranian Minister of Foreign Affairs complained to the Security Council in August that the policy of the Greek Government had produced a situation in the Balkans which threatened world peace. In August the Yugoslav Ambassador to Greece went home "on leave." On December 3 Greece took the initiative and requested the Security Council to investigate the matter of the support being provided the Greek guerrillas. This time the Council formed a Commission to make an on-the-spot investigation. In November 1947 Bulgaria and Yugoslavia entered into an alliance which was followed by a similar treaty between Bulgaria and Albania.

The lines were then clearly drawn, and when the bandits on 24 December 1947 announced a "Government of Free Greece," the announcement was received with enthusiasm in Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and

Wide World

Mines: the low road was dangerous

National Committees for Aid to the Greek People were formed. Meanwhile, the United Nations Commission had reported that "Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria have supported the guerrilla warfare in Greece."

The Mountains

Greece is composed of mountains interspersed with small, intermontane valleys. The Pindus Mountains extend southeastward from the Albanian border 160 miles to the Gulf of Korinth. A southward extension rises in the Peloponnese. The range varies in width from 40 to 60 miles. Its maximum height is 7,500 feet and it constitutes a nearly perfect barrier to east-west communication between the Albanian border and the Gulf of Korinth. Metsovan Pass, however, transits the barrier in north central Greece at an elevation of about 5,000 feet. Ground movement anywhere in the Pindus is limited by deep, narrow valleys having few flood plains.

Another mountain mass, Mounts Vermion—Olympus—Ossa—Pelion, forms a semi-circular arc along the western coast of the Aegean south of Salonika. It reaches inland at its southern extremity to join with the Pindus range south of Thessaly Plain. A wide plateau joins this mass with the Pindus north of the same plain.

Along the northern coast of the Aegean, the Rhodope Mountains extend from Bulgaria into eastern Macedonia and Thrace. While not as high as the Pindus this range, too, is steep and rugged.

Because of these mountains and others of lesser significance, movement in Greece is channelized along the few routes following the passes which connect the intermontane valleys. Elsewhere, particularly in the Pindus, great areas can be reached only on foot or by mule. Military formations cannot operate in these areas, and they have traditionally enjoyed considerable freedom from the police power of the various governments which have controlled the territory throughout its complicated history. Many of these areas have been used for generations by bandits as operating bases and sanctuaries.

Guerrilla dispositions

The first activity of the bands was confined to areas along the northern borders. Here the bands enjoyed a tactical advantage such as is rarely given to any belligerent. They could not be decisively engaged. Whenever they were hard pressed, they simply withdrew across the border. Pursuit was stopped by the border

guards of the satellites while the guerrillas prepared to reappear at a new point, or at the same point after the Government forces had withdrawn. This unneutral conduct on the part of the neighboring countries was one of the points that the Greeks complained about in their petition to the United Nations.

The case of the Greek Government in establishing these facts before the United Nations was prejudiced by a Communist propaganda campaign designed to create the impression that unrest in Greece was not confined to the border areas but spread over all Greece. This created an impression that the war had a widespread character which was scarcely consistent with the facts. Meanwhile the Communists penetrated into south and central Greece in order to stir up opposition to the Government in order to lend support to their propaganda campaign.

The Pindus range between Metsovan and the Gulf of Korinth and the range between Vermion and Pelion provided perhaps a dozen areas suitable for guerrilla operations. They were protected by their inaccessibility. From them it was possible within a few hours to raid villages on the plains and harass the roads winding through the narrow valleys. Movement from one area to another was comparatively easy, particularly at night. These areas were organized as bases of operations, but the bands were not committed to their defense. They followed guerrilla tactics here, moving from area to area to avoid being engaged.

The establishment of concentrations in south and central Greece involved an additional commitment on the part of the guerrilla high command. A line of communications by which supplies could be forwarded to these concentrations was essential. As the Government forces controlled the established routes, the Pindus range was used for this purpose. An area of the northern Pindus had to be secured to protect the point at which supplies could be moved from Albania or Yugoslavia into Greece for forwarding via the Pindus route. To meet this requirement the guerrillas committed themselves to the defense of the base areas of Grammos and Vitsi. Although alternates to the Pindus route were sometimes used, this decision remained a keystone of their strategy until the end of the war.

When the base areas were threatened the guerrillas redoubled their harassing attacks elsewhere to divert Government forces from that front. During the 1948 campaign the greatest effort was made in the Peloponnese where there had been little previous activity. Because few Government troops were in that area the guerrillas were very successful. When the Army delayed sending reinforcements several deputies from the Peloponnese withdrew from the Government. The policy of nonreinforcement was followed, however, until the stalemate in Vitsi became winter-bound, when an overwhelming force was sent to the Peloponnese. The guerrillas had grown by that time to a strength of 3,500, but their disposition was unfavorable. The naval patrol in the Gulf of Korinth prevented their escape to the mainland and the guerrillas in the Peloponnese were liquidated in early 1949.

The establishment of concentrations in south and central Greece and the base areas in the northern Pindus did not mean that the other areas along the northern frontier were inactivated. On the contrary, perhaps six mountain regions adjacent to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were used intermittently as operating bases, and approximately one-fifth of the total guerrilla strength was disposed there. A great advantage enjoyed by the guerrillas operating in Macedonia and Thrace was their ability to move from area to area under cover of the frontier. Yugoslavia occupied a central position in this covered route of communications. The Tito-Cominform rift, therefore, with the resultant closure of the border, was a serious blow as regards the disposition of the guerrillas.

In the 1948 campaign the guerrillas were able to oppose their main strength to the Army first in the Grammos and subsequently in the Vitsi region. In 1949, through occupying both areas simultaneously they allowed their forces to be split. The Army conducted its concentration so that the guerrillas were unable to determine where the main effort was to be made. Following a holding attack in Grammos the attack was delivered in Vitsi. The operation was completed so quickly that no reinforcement was possible. The Vitsi force was so disorganized and demoralized that it was unable to reinforce the Grammos position. The guerrillas had committed the fatal error of allowing their forces to be divided. They had perhaps anticipated that they would be able to shift forces from one area to the other as they had in 1948. Their inability to do so contributed to their defeat.

Wide World

Guerrillas: their needs were simple

Dispositions of the Army

As of 1947 the Army was organized into an Army Command and two corps. The former was located at Volos; the latter at Larissa and Salonika respectively. At this time



four divisions and two independent brigades assigned to one corps were disposed in Thessaly, Epirus and central Macedonia. Three divisions and one independent brigade assigned to the other corps were located in eastern Macedonia and Thrace, and four independent brigades were disposed in southern Greece and the Peloponnese. Subsequently a third corps was activated. The assignment of corps areas and the disposition of troops varied thereafter in accordance with operational requirements.

Greece has three major lines of land communications. One parallels the Pindus range on the west to connect the Gulf of Korinth with the Albanian border. A second, passing between the Pindus and the Vermion-Pelion range, connects Attika with Salonika, the Monastir Gap and the single line of east-west communications. The third follows the north shore of the Aegean paralleling the northern frontier. The majority of the towns are situated on or near these three routes. With the guerrillas exercising a precarious but tenacious control over the mountain areas of the Pindus range, the Vermion-Pelion range and along the northern borders of Macedonia and Thrace, these routes and the towns scattered along them were extremely

vulnerable. From operating bases in the mountains the guerrillas could readily descend to harass them at any point. The war, therefore, developed as a war without a fixed front.

Early efforts to arrest guerrilla activity took the form of putting out fires. That is, the Army responded to attacks by counter-attacks which came too late, by pursuits which were too leisurely to maintain contact, and by local searching operations. Uncoordinated reactions of this type accomplished little as the guerrillas attached no importance to any particular area. When attacked in one area they moved to another, sometimes only to return to the first as soon as the Government forces had withdrawn.

By April 1947 a major co-ordinated clearing operation was laid on. It was designed to drive the bandits from the Gulf of Korinth northward to the frontier after which the frontier was to be sealed. This effort failed through bad timing, poor co-ordination and lack of aggressiveness. During its course the guerrillas became so active that the Army was forced to cancel plans for a winter campaign and look to the protection of the civil community and its lines of communication. For this purpose troop units were dispersed widely.

Had troop units so dispersed been employed in local clearing operations in accordance with a co-ordinated plan, it might have been as effective as a general clearing operation. But co-ordination was lacking and the troops in place of engaging in active operations established static defenses of towns and awaited developments. This, of course, did not seriously interfere with the guerrilla program as there could never be enough troops to defend all areas by such passive efforts. Consequently, the guerrilla maintained the initiative. This created a demand for more defensive forces and prevented the concentration of Army troops for operations until the National Defense Corps had been formed.

Through the organization of the National Defense Corps the Army was able to concentrate enough troops to undertake another major clearing operation. As the extent and importance of satellite aid to the guerrillas was recognized, the idea of first seizing the northern border and thus isolating the guerrillas from their sources of supplies and replacements must have been considered. However, the concentration of the major portion of the Army in northern Greece would have exposed southern and central Greece dangerously. Moreover, once the frontier had been seized it must be garrisoned and troops so employed would not have been available for the subsequent clearing operations. Once again the operation was designed to proceed from south to north.

INP

U. S. Aid: 4,000 mules came later

The operation went well initially and the guerrillas were driven back upon their lines of communication until they reached the Grammos area. Here a front was established. When it was broken they retired to the Vitsi area where another front was established. The Army could not drive the bandits from this position and the front became a stalemate. Meanwhile the guerrillas, having filtered through the Army lines, resumed operations in south and central Greece, particularly in the Peloponnese. This required the Army to redispose its forces to mop up its rear before it could resume operations on the front. Three divisions were left to contain the guerrillas in the base areas. Guerrilla activity elsewhere prevented the reconcentration of the Army on this front for several months. A third south to north sweep brought the main strength of the Army against the main area of Vitsi and Grammos in August 1949. The ensuing battle, in which the Army's only disadvantage was the defensibility of the terrain, lasted only a few days.

During these operations the dispositions of the Army afforded it excellent communications. Its troops and supplies moved freely between the strategically located ports of Pervesa. The advantage accruing to Piraeus, Volos, Corinth, Patras and the Army through Government control of the sea was matched by its control of land communications between the ports and the major inland bases at Larisa, Kosani and Ioannina and such forward bases as Florina and Argos Orestikan. The Army, therefore, enjoyed a high degree of strategic flexibility. It could concentrate and support large forces in almost any area in Greece, provided the guerrillas did not stir up too much trouble elsewhere.

Comparison of dispositions and summary

Owing to the disposition of forces factor the guerrilla had the advantage of good terrain for evasion and for defense. The northern frontier. behind which he was able to conduct all manner of military activity in areas denied to the Army, was a particular advantage. This was cancelled in part by Yugoslavia's decreasing support following the Tito-Cominform split. Outside the northern bases areas, where the Army controlled the routes of communication and the guerrillas operated from adjacent and intervening mountain areas, the war developed as a war without a front. Here the Army's

Wide World

Disposition of troops varied with requirements

control of communications gave it strategic flexibility and tactical staying power. Whenever Army forces ventured off the established routes, as they must to engage the guerrilla, they found the terrain the greatest obstacle. The guerrilla had superior observation, the ability to execute rapid tactical movements and the ability to interpose terrain obstacles between himself and the Government forces.

The guerrillas' control of communications outside the base areas was of a low order. This influenced adversely his ability to concentrate forces and to supply them, particularly during a protracted engagement. This disadvantage was minimal so long as the "Democratic Army" conducted guerrilla-type operations using small bands. It grew in significance as the bands formed into battalions, brigades and divisions.

SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

The "Democratic Army"

General

The supply situation of the "Democratic Army" may be described in terms of overall availability of supplies and their distribution. The two were closely interrelated.

The guerrillas were supported by foreign aid, but not all supplies were imported. In fact, the quantities of supplies and equipment involved were relatively small, but this small quantity of supplies was still essential to the continuance of the guerrilla movement in Greece.

Requirements

The U. S. soldier uses each day of combat 37 pounds of supplies, including: 6 pounds of rations, 6 pounds of equipment, 5 pounds of fuel and oil and 20 pounds of ammunition. Had the guerrillas used supplies on a comparable basis their 25,000 men would have needed a million pounds or four hundred 2½-ton truckloads daily. Needless to say, they did not use supplies on this scale.

The average guerrilla was inured to hardship. His needs were few. He was satisfied with a diet of bread, milk, cheese, lamb and goat. Such items as salt, sugar, coffee and tobacco were difficult to come by and were sometimes missing. His equipment comprised boats, clothing, a blanket, a knife or bayonet and a firearm. Medical supplies, while negligible on a pro rata basis, did in the aggregate constitute a significant quantity. The ammunition carried on the individual was 20 to 30 rounds, while 200-300 were carried for machine guns. Owing to this low initial allowance and the difficulty of effecting resupply in combat, ammunition was used sparingly. The mine, however, was used extensively.

In considering ammunition requirements, a distinction must be made between troops operating within the defended base areas and those operating elsewhere. The number of artillery, AT and AA guns and heavy mortars in the former areas increased requirements there. Omitting this special case, the daily resupply for the average guerrilla did not exceed five pounds made up as follows: rations—3 pounds, equipment—1 pound and ammunition—1 pound, a total of 5 pounds.

Sources of supply

As regards sources of supply, a distinction must be made again between guerrillas operating in south and central Greece and those operating in the region of the northern frontier, particularly within the defended base areas. Guerrillas scattered over thousands of square miles in the former areas were able to procure a high proportion of supplies locally. Virtually all rations were so obtained. Foodstuffs were procured by requisition upon peasants living within bandit-controlled areas. In addition, raids were made upon towns and villages to obtain food, and it was common practice for the guerrillas to drive off flocks of sheep and goats for later consumption. Other sources were raids upon stores of the Army and Gendarmerie, and Communist supporters in the larger towns sometimes sent food to the hills. Difficulties in getting such supplies past the authorities prevented the last named becoming a major source.

Other supplies, too, could be obtained locally. Clothing, weapons and ammunition in significant quantities were secured by raids on Army and Gendarmerie stores, but a more lucrative source was the armed civilians who frequently surrendered their weapons when confronted by strong opposition. Arms and ammunition were sometimes taken in battle, and on occasion deserters from the Army carried their arms over to the guerrillas. In addition, the Army was careless in supply discipline and often left ammunition scattered over positions.

Local procurement, however, did not satisfy bandit requirements for equipment and ammunition. The major portion of these items and clothing came from the satellites. Transportation was by mule trains sent north by the bands to pick up their supplies. The most commonly used supply routes followed the Pindus range. However, the Vermion-Pelion range was used to some extent, and efforts were sometimes made to use other areas such as Mourgana west of the Pindus.



Courtesy LIFE-TIME Inc.

Terrain: the Guerrilla's greatest asset

Wide World

After three years of fighting — a return to normalcy

The requirement for transport probably varied between one and two pounds per day for each guerrilla operating in south and central Greece. This seems insignificant, but neither the supplies nor their quantity were insignificant. Without these supplies, which could not be obtained locally, the guerrillas could not function effectively. They were vital, therefore, to guerrilla operations.

Five thousand guerrillas in south and central Greece would have used 50 to 100 animal loads daily. Taking 120 miles as the average distance from the base areas to the users, the turn around time was in the neighborhood of two weeks. Thus, 700 to 1400 animals would have been employed constantly in this traffic, even if no allowance is made for losses in transit. These were actually quite high. Mule trains were intercepted frequently by the Air Force or Army units and damaged or destroyed.

The problems involved in organizing the routing and protection of the supply trains moving between the base areas and the bands in central and southern Greece were many. They were greatest when the Army was active. During such times the bandits were expending more supplies than normally. They were forced to abandon stores which could not be carried. They were unable to requisition supplies in areas through which they might be passing, as this took time and provided information to the Army. Similarly raids upon towns or Army stores were impracticable. Finally, the mule trains from the north had greater difficulty in getting through, and not infrequently the bands were unable to keep their rendezvous with such trains. On top of this, greater numbers of casualties required evacuation to the north. On many occasions, bands experienced local and temporary shortages of supply due to these factors. During the 1949 campaign, however, the operations of the Army so reduced the effectiveness of the guerrilla supply system as to render it incapable of meeting the minimum needs of the bands in south and central Greece.

For the bands operating near the northern frontier the pattern of the supply operation was different. In Macedonia and Thrace—rich agri-

cultural lands—the procurement of foodstuffs was no problem. Other classes of supply could be distributed so easily from the border that the dependence of the guerrillas upon local procurement was reduced. A greater proportion of clothing, arms and ammunition came from the satellites than was the case in south and central Greece.

In the defended bases of Vitsi and Grammos the guerrillas exercised complete control and all resources of the region were at their disposal. There is little agriculture in these areas though, and as the density of troops was high not all rations could be procured locally. Likewise, there were few local sources of arms, ammunition and clothing. Consequently the support of 10,000 guerrillas in the base areas might have required as much as 50,000 pounds of supplies daily, but delivery and distribution were comparatively easy.

As the provision of military supplies by the satellites was illegal, it was conducted clandestinely outside the base areas where supply trains crossed the border under the cover of darkness and at remote points along the frontier. The bulk of the supplies, however, crossed the frontier on the routes covered by the Vitsi and Grammos positions. Roads leading from Yugoslavia and Albania into these areas could accommodate not only animals but carts and motor vehicles, and, since they were protected by the fortified areas south of the border, the bandits enjoyed great freedom in their use.

The receipt, storage and distribution of supplies for 10,000 bandits within the base areas and the forwarding of supplies for 5,000 bandits in south and central Greece resulted in the accumulation of various logistical activities in the base areas. Located there was the Director of the Central Ordnance of General Headquarters. There were extensive food depots where the food was stored in houses on the outskirts of villages. Ammunition was stored in the open on the slopes of hills on both sides of roads where it was readily accessible. Among the logistical installations were tailor shops, shoemaker shops, armories, saddlers, a base post office and a hospital. Other installations included an officers' school, two training camps with a capacity of 300 men each and a camp for prisoners of war.

Satellite aid

Virtually all hospital facilities in the southern part of the satellites were filled habitually with bandit wounded. Many camps were maintained for refugees from Greece. At some of them rebel fighters were trained and equipped with arms prior to their departure for Greece. Not too much is known concerning the mechanism through which aid was provided. It is hard to determine what roles the governments played in this program or how much was done by the "societies of assistance to the Greek people." Where Communism had only just emerged from a revolutionary movement to become the Government, the line between official and quasi-official activity is indistinct. Non-military supplies may have been collected and moved to the frontier by the several "committees for assistance to the Greeks," but certainly all societies of this nature were Government-sponsored. Purely military supplies, in all probability were provided directly the governments.

The Tito-Cominform rift

Yugoslavia occupied a key position in the provision of foreign aid to the Greek guerrillas. It had a pivotal position geographically. Bulgaria was remote from the area of greatest guerrilla activity. Yugoslavia lay between Albania and Bulgaria. More than that it completely surrounded Albania so that the latter had no access to the USSR or other satellites except via Yugoslav territory.

As the Grammos area was adjacent to Albania, supplies moved to Greece through this area had to pass through Albania, but this does not mean they had their source there. On the contrary, the greater part came from Yugoslavia. The Vitsi position could be reached from either Albania or Yugoslavia. Prior to January 1949 the bulk of supplies entering Vitsi came from Yugoslavia. During the month of January, however, supplies from Yugoslavia declined to almost nothing and virtually all supplies received after that date came from Albania. This and the low levels in certain classes of supplies found in the Vitsi and Grammos positions after the collapse of the guerrilla defense, suggests that the Tito-Cominform rift so affected the supply situation of the "Democratic Army" that it was, by the spring of 1949, no longer capable of carrying on operations on the scale of 1947 and 1948. Indeed, this may have been the proximate cause of the guerrilla collapse.

The Greek National Army

Supplies and equipment were provided the National Army on the basis of authorized tables of equipment. These tables provided few luxuries and were in some cases too spare. The British had been unable to meet all requirements, but the most essential combat supplies and equipment had been provided. With U. S. aid the Army was completely equipped by the middle of 1948. Thereafter procurement was designed to keep it so equipped and supplied and to meet the requirements caused by increases in the forces or in their allowances. Supply shortages probably never seriously affected the combat efficiency of the Army. If so, it was in any case fully equipped and supplied according to the accepted standards by the middle of 1948. Thereafter there were no significant shortages.

As regards the distribution of supplies, the Army had been handicapped prior to the inception of the U. S. aid program by shortgages in motor transport. When these shortages were made up it was discovered that too much reliance had been placed upon motors and that there was a greater requirement for animal transport, one U. S. mission assisted in the organization and training of animal transport and in the summer of 1948 placed orders for 4,000 mules. In June 1949 all infantry battalions were placed on the mountain unit establishment and all vehicles were withdrawn to the brigade motor transport platoon. Supplementing the animals organic to the units, 12 mule transport companies were organized. While these changes in the organization of transport increased the flexibility of the Army in its anti-guerrilla warfare, it would scarcely be necessary to take the view that the Army had previously been handicapped in its operations by inadequate means for the transportation and distribution of supplies. USMC

(To be concluded next month)

passing in review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO OUR READERS

Impossible Project...

THE ATOMIC SUBMARINE AND ADMIRAL RICKOVER—Clay Blair, Jr. 269 pages, Illustrated. Henry Holt and Company, New York. $3.50

Behind the President, on the last row of grandstand seats with the high ranking military officers, a thin, silver-haired man sat stiffly erect, staring at the President's back. The man's mouth was clamped shut, expressionless. His hands were knotted tightly in his lap as he listened. The man was a Navy Captain named Hyman George Rickover, 52 years old, a graduate of the Naval Aacademy, class of 1922. As head of a special naval task group Rickover had conceived, designed, fought and pushed the *Nautilus* into existence.

The laying of the keel of the world's first nuclear-powered submarine, *Nautilus,* on June 14, 1952, was a memorable event for the small New England seaport of Groton, Connecticut. The President of the United States, Harry Truman, came by special train to preside over the ceremony. The Governor of the state, the Secretaries and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission — all were on hand, trailed by scores of Secret Service men and reporters. Never had the town of Groton seen so much political and military brass assembled.

The President stood up, walked to the large bank of microphones and tried to explain what the building of the *Nautilus* could mean to our country and to the world at large. In the space of four short years, he said, a project which had been considered practically impossible, had been completed. Atomic power, as such, had become a reality.

The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover is the story of the *Nautilus,* of its conception, the planning and schooling necessary for its design, and of its eventual construction, including the almost unbelievable detail to which Admiral Rickover went to insure that the best in brains and material were used for the *Nautilus.*

Interesting as the portion of the book dealing with the submarine itself is, of far greater interest is the history of the man who was assigned the task of creating her. It was his fantastic courage and determination against all odds, physical, mental and political, that provided the driving force which enabled the Navy to produce its first atomic submarine. Clay Blair, Jr., of the staff of *Time-Life,* has produced a first-class, first-hand account of the harnessing of atomic power in a smoothly written, intensely interesting narrative.

Reviewed by Major G. P. Averill

Hard-Charger...

COMMAND MISSIONS, A PERSONAL STORY—LtGen L. K. Truscott, Jr., 556 pages. E. P. Dutton & Co. Inc., New York. $7.50

As blunt as his command procedures, General Truscott's book, contains more pungent quotes, more specific advice to future commanders, junior or senior, than its peers.

General Truscott may strike sparks by his frank personal appraisals of superiors and subordinates, Allied or American, injected as they fit into and clarify the action. Yet compliment or condemnation is incidental. With the same objectivity are weighed the General's own mistakes. At Anzio he "placed each regiment on two lines in depth" with unfortunate results. "There I learned no unit can defend while looking over its shoulder."

Really controversial issues the author reserves for larger targets; tactical, logistic, policy and organizational criticisms where he pulls no punches. Several times, so casually they might escape notice, the General puts his head on the block for his convictions. He was never relieved, except for assignment to greater responsibilities.

Strict disciplinarian that he was, Truscott plumbed many secrets of leadership in this method. He "learned that the American soldier was unwilling to have a platoon or company commander suffer for him." Thus fines imposed publicly upon junior officers, on the spot of their men's derelictions, brought results. That the general could add "it wasn't known that the fines were never collected" may be one small hint why long after he left it, men of the 3rd Division continued to call themselves "Truscott's Division," a fact not found anywhere in the book.

Reviewed by Colonel C. G. Reinhardt

No Four-letter Words...

PLATOON—Adam Singer. 153 pages. Lion Book, New York. $1.25

The order from Regiment directed the 40-man platoon to move across the desert floor, climb the 2,000 foot wind-swept peaks of the enemy-infested Long Mountains and establish positions on the other side. Command sergeant Makin knew that 40,000 men couldn't do it.

Of all of them, only Makin, lance corporal Donovan and ordinary soldier Bills had ever fought the enemy. They knew their foe for what he was; "dirty and crafty, ignorant, gibbering in their strange tongues but they had sharp eyes, great patience and a deep, unwavering desire for death. Their own or the enemy's, it mattered little to them."

With a weakling for a commander and a craven for an adjutant what chance did the platoon have?

Platoon would stand out as an unusual war story if only because author Adam Singer says what he has to say in just 153 concise pages. It is doubly unusual because Singer steers clear of hackneyed stratagems which are the common failing of the average war story.

He credits his reader with imagination by leaving great gaps in his story. None of the 40 men are given the dignity of a first name. Singer never tells us just what war is going on or who's versus whom. Nor is the fantastic order which sends the platoon on its suicide mission ever explained. The four-letter word is conspicuous by its absence as is any reference to women.

Platoon is basically a story about men and the lives they lead and the deaths they die. It is a strange, oftentimes terrifiying story because it is like watching a valiant fight to the finish between 40 ants and an anteater.

Reviewed by MSgt. C. R. Barrow

Top Of The World...

THE CONQUEST OF EVEREST—Sir John Hunt (With a Chapter on the Final Assault by Sir Edmund Hillary) 300 pages, illustrated. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co. $6.00

"This is the story of how, on May 29, 1953, two men, both endowed with outstanding stamina and skill, inspired by an unflinching resolve, reached the top of Everest and came back unscratched to join their comrades." Yet this is not the whole story, for in the words of Sir (then Colonel) John Hunt, leader of the expedition and author of the book, *The Conquest Of Everest* "was not the work of one day" nor was it merely the effort of these "two men" alone.

The Conquest Of Everest has the quality of making the reader feel that he is part of the expedition, especially when it is endowed with such a rich collection of color and black and white photographs. Sir John Hunt is equally adept at organizing a successful book as he is at organizing successful mountain climbing expeditions. The book should be of particular interest to military minds, for the conquest of this great mountain closely parallels the conquest of a military objective. It is also interesting to note the similarity of terminology between the military and mountain climbing.

It was not merely coincidence that the military experience of the author should be of immense value in organizing the forces which were to assault and conquer the world's highest mountain.

Reviewed by Captain C. W. Blythe

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Books on Parade

Kill or Get Killed *Lieutenant Colonel Rex Applegate.* This book describes the principles and essential techniques of hand-to-hand fighting. $4.00

The Man Who Never Was *Ewen Montagu.* It was necessary to make the Germans believe they had stumbled by accident on the greatest intelligence leak of the war. The story of how this plan was undertaken by the British, coupled with authentic proof of its spectacular success, makes one of the most startling and enthralling true tales to come out of World War II. $2.75

The Great Iron Ship *James Dugan.* For the first time, the full and incredible saga of the *Great Eastern,* the mighty vessel built over a century ago that dwarfs all but the largest of today's ocean liners. The most spectacular phenomenon of her century, she laid the Atlantic Cable, but sailed under a curse that killed or ruined hundreds of men. She was a pleasure palace and a floating graveyard—a laughing stock and a tragic heroine. $3.50

The Dark City *Hartvig Andersen.* A true account of the adventures of a secret agent in Berlin. It is a wonderfully revealing picture of the clash of totalitarian giants (Germany and Russia) and what it is like to be a mere human caught between them. $3.50

The High and the Mighty *Ernest K. Cann.* Here are twenty people,

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Irrespective of the award of the "Prizes," one or more essays may receive "Honorable Mention," if of sufficient merit to justify the award. Essays awarded "Honorable Mention" will receive such compensation as may be adjudged by the Editorial Board.

The following rules will govern this competition:

(1) Essays awarded "Prize" or "Honorable Mention" are for publication in the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. Essays not awarded a prize or honorable mention may be published at the discretion of the Editorial Board, and the authors of such essays will be compensated at the rate established for articles not submitted in competition.

(2) Essays should not exceed 5,000 words.

(3) All essays must be typewritten, double-spaced, on paper approximately 8½" x 11", and must be submitted in triplicate, each copy complete in itself and firmly bound together.

(4) The name of the competitor shall not appear on the essay. Each essay heading must contain an identifying phrase consisting of the last five words of the essay, in addition to the title. This phrase shall appear:

(a) On the title page of the essay.

(b) On the outside of a sealed envelope containing the name (rank and serial number, if any) of the competitor.

(c) Above the name and address of the competitor, inside the envelope containing this identification.

The envelope containing the author's identification will not be opened until winning essays have been determined. Essays and identifying envelope must be mailed in a large sealed envelope marked "Prize Essay Contest Group I, II, III" (as appropriate) to the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia.

(5) Essays must be received by the Secretary-Treasurer, Marine Corps Association, on or before 30 September 1954.

(6) Awards will be made by ballot and without knowledge of the names of the competitors.

(7) The attention of contestants is called to the fact that an essay must be original and should be analytical or interpretive.

Marine Corps Association

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

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